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THE CONSTITUTION, RACIAL PREFERENCE,
AND THE SUPREME COURT'S
INSTITUTIONAL AMBIVALENCE:
REFLECTIONS ON METRO BROADCASTING*
ROBERT A. SEDLERt
INmRODUCTON: THE "UNRsoLvABLE DiLEMMA" AND THE UNMADE
VALUE JUDGMENT
The matter of racial preference for black Americans and other
traditionally disadvantaged racial-ethnic minorities' in the alloca-
tion of governmental and societal benefits sharply divides American
society today. It is a no-win issue, because it necessarily involves
conflicting ideals and values. On the one hand, there is the ideal
* Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 110 S.
Ct. 2997 (1990), reh'g denied, 59 U.S.L.W. 3198 (1990).
t Professor of Law, Wayne State University. A.B. 1956, J.D. 1959,
University of Pittsburgh. The author was of counsel on the amicus curiae brief
filed in Metro Broadcasting on behalf of the Congressional Black Caucus, the
NAACP, the National Black Media Coalition, and the League of United Latin
American Citizens, urging the Court to uphold the FCC's minority ownership
policies.
1. Other racial-ethnic groups, such as Hispanics and Native Americans,
have been subject to discrimination and victimization in American society, because
the dominant white majority has perceived them as "non-white." Since these
groups have been subject to discrimination and victimization, for constitutional
purposes, a legislative body should be able to include them in any racial preference
given to black Americans. However, to the extent that the justification for a
particular racial preference is overcoming the present consequences of identified
past discrimination by governmental or private entities, that discrimination must
be identified for each group to whom the preference is given. City of Richmond
v. J.A. Croson Co., 109 S. Ct. 706 (1989). While Asian Americans have also
been subject to racial discrimination and victimization, the consequences of that
discrimination by and large do not remain. Asian Americans as a group appear
to have a "fair share" of societal power and participation in relation to their
representation among the general population and, as a group, do not suffer
economic or educational disadvantage.
It is the consequences of the long history of discrimination against black
Americans that have been the predicate for racial preferences designed to over-
come those consequences. While other racial-ethnic groups may be included in a
particular preference, the focal point of any preference has been the consequences
of the racial discrimination suffered by black Americans.
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of a racially neutral society, in which racial considerations play
no part whatsoever in the allocation of the benefits of that society.
On the other hand, American society has not even remotely come
close to realizing that ideal. We have had a long history of racial
discrimination against black Americans, and the consequences of
this social history of racism2 for black Americans as a group are
manifest in today's society. There is an enormous "economic gap"
between blacks and whites, with blacks suffering disproportionate
unemployment and underemployment. Black workers are concen-
trated in the low-paying and low-prestige occupations and earn a
family income of only slightly more than half the family income
of whites. 3 There is likewise a racial "educational gap" with blacks
continuing to lag significantly behind whites in terms of measured
academic achievement and quality of educational experience.4 Above
all, there is the racial "power gap." Blacks are seriously under-
represented in positions of societal power, in the "elite" profes-
sions, and in the "economic mainstream." 5
At the present time, American society officially condemns and
seeks to prevent the racial discrimination that has long been
practiced against black Americans in all aspects of American life.
2. The term, social history of racism, is a convenient way of summarizing
the history of discrimination against black Americans. The social history of
racism was the aftermath of slavery, and like slavery, it was predicated on and
justified by the supposed moral inferiority of the black race. It is a history of
an official status of inferiority established by law, of rampant discrimination in
employment, of ghettoization, of segregated and inadequate schooling, and of
the denial of access to political and economic power. Racial discrimination was
often commanded by government and, when not commanded, was tolerated and
encouraged. Private entities and individuals added their significant contribution
to this pattern of racism. Only in the past three decades has any real progress
been made to halt the overt discrimination practiced against black Americans in
the United States. See Sedler, The Constitution and the Consequences of the
Social History of Racism (Essays in Honor of Justice Thurgood Marshall), 40
ARK. L. Rnv. 677, 677-682 (1987) [hereinafter Consequences].
3. For the now-familiar dreary litany of statistics, see Sedler, The Con-
stitution, Racial Preference, and the Equal Participation Objective, in Slavery
and Its Consequences: The Constitution, Equality, and Race 125 n.17 (Goldwin
& Kaufman eds. 1988) [hereinafter The Constitution].
4. Again, see the dreary litany of statistics, id. at 25 n.18. For a more
focused discussion of the etiology of the racial "educational gap" as it appears
in the 90% black Detroit school system, see Sedler, The Profound Impact of
Milliken v. Bradley, 33 WAYNE L. REv. 1693, 1703-09 (1987).
5. For a discussion of the underrepresentation of blacks in the "elite"
professions and the ownership of business enterprises, see Consequences, supra
note 2, at 681 n.7.
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We now have a system of prevention: the law prohibits present
racial discrimination against blacks and provides remedies for such
discrimination. The system of prevention, however, does not pur-
port to deal directly with the present consequences of the social
history of racism and is not designed to do so. It is premised on
adherence to racial neutrality: the absence of racial discrimination.
However, adherence to racial neutrality, given the present conse-
quences of the social history of racism, will often put blacks at a
disadvantage in comparison with whites and thus will perpetuate
societal racial inequality. Precisely because the present conse-
quences of the social history of racism are so pervasive and are
self-perpetuating and self-reinforcing, the system of prevention,
even if vigorously enforced, will do little to alter the condition of
societal racial inequality and the disadvantaged and subordinate
position of black Americans in this Nation.
Racial preference-the explicit use of race-conscious criteria
designed to benefit blacks as a group-is a positive intervention
directed against the present consequences of the social history of
racism that are suffered by blacks as a group. It is intended to
act on and to alleviate those consequences, bringing about a more
equal participation of blacks with whites in important aspects of
American life. Furthermore, it strives to reduce the condition of
societal racial inequality and the disadvantaged and subordinate
position of blacks.
Racial preference for blacks has its costs. The direct costs are
borne by individual whites who would have received the benefit
in question-a job in the government or private sector, admission
to a law school or medical school of one's choice, the award of
a government contract or broadcasting license-were it not for the
preference for blacks. These whites suffer a clear disadvantage
because of race, and it may be assumed that, for the most part,
they did not benefit directly from the past discrimination against
blacks. It cannot be doubted then that a policy of racial preference
produces unfairness to individual whites,6 and it is this unfair
result that gives rise to principled opposition to racial preference. 7
6. This unfairness seems most egregious to an adversely affected white
when the particular black recipient of a preference is not a person who has been
demonstrably disadvantaged by the consequences of the past discrimination, such
as a black student from an advantaged background who went to good schools
and subsequently, is admitted to a law school with a substantially lower grade
point and LSAT score than a rejected white applicant.
7. The costs of racial preference, however, are not borne by whites as a
1990] 1189
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More significantly perhaps, racial preference is inconsistent
with the ideal of a racially neutral society. Opponents of racial
preference, invoking familiar aphorisms such as "the Constitution
is color-blind," "two wrongs don't make a right," and "the cure
is worse than the disease," contend that racial preference is not a
legitimate method to overcome the present consequences of the
social history of racism that are suffered by blacks as a group.
They also contend that racial preference "stigmatizes blacks as
inferior" and thus is self-defeating to the long-range goal of racial
equality.
Since racial preference produces unfairness against individual
whites and brings into play conflicting ideals and values, it is not
surprising that the controversy over racial preference cannot be
resolved as a matter of consensus. Persons of good will, who
believe in the objective of a racially equal society, can disagree
vehemently over the legitimacy of racial preference as a means of
bringing about that objective. The "unresolvable dilemma" that
American society faces today is that on the one hand, without
positive intervention, such as racial preference, the present conse-
quences of the social history of racism will not be overcome in
the remotely foreseeable future, if ever. On the other hand, inter-
vention by means of racial preference is inconsistent with the ideal
of racial neutrality and unfairly imposes costs on innocent indi-
vidual whites.
Today, however, in a number of different contexts, and per-
haps with a variety of motivations, governmental bodies have
provided for racial preference in governmental programs and op-
erations. Public universities have race-conscious admissions poli-
cies. States and local governmental units have race-conscious hiring
and promotional policies and have established procurement policies
explicitly favoring minority business enterprises. Additionally, the
federal government has various programs benefiting racial minor-
ities, such as the "minority enhancement" and "distress sale"
broadcasting policies at issue in Metro Broadcasting.8 The Consti-
tution now comes into play, and the "unresolvable dilemma" now
has a constitutional dimension. As a distinguished constitutional
scholar has observed: "Once taken into our constitutional law
group. Whites as a group now have full participation in all important aspects of
American life and will not be injured if that participation is shared with blacks.
Whites as a group, of course, have no legitimate interest in maintaining their
present position of societal dominance.
8. 110 S. Ct. 2997 (1990).
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system, the dialogue takes on a new seriousness. It is, therefore,
critically important that we get the questions right and the answers
right, because constitutional law is written in concrete and is not
easily washed out by rain or tears." 9
In dealing with the constitutionality of the use of racial pref-
erence in governmental programs and operations, the Court has
been struggling hard to "get the questions and the answers right."
Clearly, it has failed to achieve an institutional consensus on the
constitutional permissibility of governmental racial preference. This
may be in no small part because it cannot institutionally agree on
what the "right questions" are. It may fairly be suggested that
the "unresolvable dilemma" that confronts American society on
the question of racial preference has carried over to the Court,
and that the Court has been suffering an extreme institutional
ambivalence over the constitutional permissibility of racial pref-
erence. The Court institutionally has not been willing to make the
hard and fundamental value judgment that would enable it to
resolve the dilemma. Is the interest in trying to overcome the
present consequences of the social history of racism and to bring
about the equal participation of racial minorities in all important
aspects of American life of sufficient importance and validity to
justify a departure from the principle of racial neutrality and the
resulting racial disadvantage to adversely affected individual whites?
If the Court had made the value judgment in favor of what I
have called the equal participation objective, 0 the constitutional
controversy would be resolved. Racial preference designed to over-
come the present consequences of the social history of racism and
to bring about the equal participation of black Americans in all
important aspects of American life would advance a constitution-
ally permissible objective. The only remaining question would be
whether a particular form of racial preference is an appropriate
means of achieving that objective.' In this connection, the burden
9. Dixon, Bakke: A Constitutional Analysis, 67 CALM. L. Ruv. 69, 70
(1979).
10. See, The Constitution, supra, note 3, at 125-38. See also Sedler, Racial
Preference and the Constitution: The Societal Interest in the Equal Participation
Objective, 26 WAYNE L. REv. 1227 (1980) [hereinafter Racial Preference].
11. This fundamental question has been textually resolved in the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Section 15, dealing with equality rights, contains
two subsections. Subsection (1) provides that: "Every individual is equal before
and under the law and has the right to equal protection and equal benefit of the
law without discrimination and, in particular, without discrimination based on
race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical
11911990]
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on adversely affected individual whites would have to be taken
into account, and the particular form of preference could not be
one that "unfairly trammels" the interests of individual whites. 12
Conversely, the Court could have made the opposite value
judgment. It could have held that the principle of racial neutrality
was of such overriding significance that it precluded the govern-
ment from using any racial preference for blacks as a means of
trying to overcome the present consequences of the social history
of racism and to advance the equal participation objective. 3 If the
Court had made this value judgment, all forms of racial preference
benefiting blacks would be unconstitutional and the government
would have to use race-neutral means to try to bring about a
condition of racial equality for blacks.
As things now stand, the Court institutionally has refused to
make either value judgment. In the seminal Bakke case, 14 four
Justices, Brennan, White, Marshall and Blackmun, were willing to
make the value judgment in favor of racial preference by taking
the position that the government's interest in overcoming the
present consequences of "societal discrimination" was a suffi-
ciently important interest to justify an appropriate use of race-
conscious criteria directed toward this objective. They also con-
tended that the use of race-conscious criteria for this purpose was
a "benign" use, 5 the constitutionality of which should be evaluated
disability." Subsection (2) goes on to provide that: "Subsection (1)" does not
prohibit any law, program or activity that has as its object the amelioration of
conditions of disadvantaged individuals or groups including those that are dis-
advantaged because of race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age
or mental or physical disability."
12. This is the standard the Court uses to determine if racial preference
designed to alleviate the underrepresentation of minorities or women in an
employer's work force is permissible under Title VII. United Steelworkers of
America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 208-09 (1979).
13. In support of this proposition, it has been contended that the Consti-
tution should be interpreted to prohibit the "differential treatment of other
human beings by race," Van Alstyne, Rites of Passage: Race, the Supreme Court,
and the Constitution, 46 U. Cm. L. Rnv. 775, 809 (1979), and that "the proper
constitutional principle is not no 'invidious' racial or ethnic discrimination, but
no use of racial or ethnic criteria in the distribution of governmental benefits or
burdens." Posner, The DeFunis Case and the Constitutionality of Preferential
Treatment of Racial Minorities, 1974 Sup. CT. RPv. 1, 25.
14. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
15. "Government may take race into account when it acts not to demean
or insult any racial group, but to remedy disadvantages cast on minorities by
past racial prejudice, at least when appropriate findings have been made by




under the "important and substantial relationship" standard rather
than under the "compelling governmental interest" standard.1 6 As
we will see, the issue of the appropriate standard of review for
"benign" racial classifications came to the fore again in Metro
Broadcasting. However, the position that overcoming the present
consequences of "societal discrimination" justifies the use of race-
conscious criteria has never commanded a majority of the Court
and apparently, is no longer shared by Justice White. 17 Thus, the
Court in Bakke failed to make the value judgment in favor of the
constitutional permissibility of racial preference.
At the other end of the spectrum, it now appears that three
Justices, Rehnquist, Scalia and Kennedy, and possibly O'Connor
as well,'8 are prepared to make the opposite value judgment. They
have indicated that they believe that use of racial preference is
unconstitutional in virtually all circumstances, and that efforts to
bring about a condition of racial equality must be accomplished
by race-neutral means.
Since five Members of the Court have never been willing to
make the same value judgment about the constitutional permissi-
bility of racial preference either way, the fundamental value ques-
tion has not been resolved institutionally by the Court. It is in
this sense that the Court may be said to suffer an institutional
ambivalence over the question.' 9 At least until Metro Broadcast-
ing,20 it appeared that the Court, or more accurately, some mem-
16. Id. at 358-62.
17. In City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 109 S. Ct. 706 (1989), Justice
White joined in Justice O'Connor's opinion for the Court, including Part III-B,
where she specifically rejected the city's claim that it was entitled to adopt a
minority business enterprise "set aside" in order to remedy the present effects
of past societal discrimination. Id. at 723-28.
18. As will be discussed subsequently, the inclusion of Justice O'Connor
in this group is based on her opinion in Metro Broadcasting. While Justice
O'Connor has repeatedly stated that the government has a "compelling" interest
in overcoming the present consequences of identified past racial discrimination,
she has strongly indicated that in most circumstances the government must
advance this interest by "race-neutral" means. In no case in which she has
participated, has she held constitutional the particular use of race-conscious
criteria that was at issue. Furthermore, her opinion in Metro Broadcasting
indicates that she may be willing to make the value judgment against the
constitutional permissibility of racial preference in all or virtually all circum-
stances.
19. As will be discussed subsequently, the replacement of Justice Brennan
by Justice Souter could move the Court closer to an institutional consensus
against the constitutional permissiblity of racial preference.
20. 110 S. Ct. 2997 (1990).
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bers of the Court, were looking for an "easy way out," by deciding
the specific question presented in the particular case without ad-
dressing broader issues or resolving the fundamental value ques-
tion. The racial preference cases typically have seen a number of
separate opinions and narrow holdings giving little guidance beyond
the specific kind of racial preference involved in the particular
case. We will now consider the cases leading up to Metro Broad-
casting.21
The Reflection of Institutional Ambivalence: From Bakke to Croson
Bakke, the Court's seminal racial preference case, 2 involved a
constitutional challenge to a university medical school's race-con-
scious admissions policy, under which 16 of the 100 places were
reserved for minority applicants. In that case, four Justices sought
to avoid the constitutional question entirely by finding 'that the
use of any racial preference in university admissions was prohibited
by Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. This effort failed
when Justice Powell joined Justices Brennan, White, Marshall and
Blackmun to hold that Title VI prohibited oniy such use of race-
conscious criteria as would be unconstitutional if employed by a
governmental body. Thus, the Title VI and constitutional questions
merged, and Bakke established the permissible use of race-con-
scious admissions criteria both for public universities and for
private universities subject to Title VI.
That permissible use, according to Justice Powell, applying the
"compelling governmental interest" standard of review,2 related
to the university's interest in achieving a racially diverse student
body. This interest, said Justice Powell, was "compelling," and
justified the consideration of race as a "single, but important
factor" in determining admission to the university. Since the use
of a fixed racial quota, in Justice Powell's view, would "hinder
rather than further attainment of genuine diversity," he found it
to be unconstitutional. In order to bring about a holding of the
21. Id.
22. An earlier case involving a challenge to a law school's race-conscious
admissions program was dismissed as moot, when the plaintiff, who had been
successful in the state trial court and had been permitted to enroll in the law
school, had registered for the final term of his third year by the time the case
had reached the Supreme Court. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974).
23. Powell strongly insisted that the "compelling governmental interest"
standard of review applied to all uses of race-conscious criteria, including those
benefiting racial minorities. 438 U.S. at 287-305.
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Court on this issue, the Brennan opinion, joined in by White,
Marshall and Blackmun, in effect agreed with Powell's position,
albeit in a footnote. 24
As a practical matter, Bakke settled the question of the per-
missibility of racial preference in university admissions. After
Bakke, the universities revised their racial-admissions programs in
accordance with Powell's "competitive consideration of race and
ethnic origin" approach and justified the new programs as ad-
vancing the universities' "compelling" interest in "attaining edu-
cational diversity. "21 Universities, now, need not advance the
additional justification, as many universities had done prior to
Bakke, that there is a strong public interest in increasing the
number of minority physicians and lawyers. While this is obviously
a major motivation for racial preference in admission to medical
school and law school,26 the "educational diversity" justification
is sufficient for constitutional purposes. 27
The Powell approach in Bakke thus gave the Court, institu-
tionally, an "easier way out" to decide the case.U Bakke holds no
24. "We also agree... that a plan like the 'Harvard' plan is constitutional
... at least so long as the use of race to achieve an integrated student body is
necessitated by the lingering effects of past discrimination." Id. at 326 n.1
(Brennan, J.) (footnote omitted).
25. See Lesnick, What Does Bakke Require of Law Schools? 128 U. PA.
L. REv. 141 (1979).
26. For a discussion of this point, see The Constitution, supra note 3, at
131-33.
27. Powell also said that it was constitutionally permissible for the university
to "pay some attention to the numbers" to efisure that in a given year a
reasonable number of minority students would be enrolled. So long as the
university does not impose a rigid "minimum quota," it can take race into
account in every case until it reaches its "goal" for that year. 438 U.S. at 316-
19. While Justice Powell insisted that the difference between "goals" and
"quotas" was of constitutional dimension, the effect of Bakke is to enable the
universities to enroll a reasonable number of minority students each year.
Moreover, since the objective is to "attain racial and ethnic diversity," the
university is permitted to include other groups, such as Hispanics and Native
Americans, in the preference. Because the various ethnic groups that comprise
the white population and Asian Americans do not suffer from a demonstrable
"educational gap," the normal workings of a race-neutral admissions process
(one based primarily on comparative objective academic indicators, such as grades
and test scores) are likely to produce a reasonable number of students from other
ethnic groups. In this sense, ethnic diversity is "built in," and a university student
body will reflect the ethnic mix of the geographic area from which the university's
student body is drawn. It is only because of the racial "educational gap" that
race-conscious admissions policies are necessary to bring about racial diversity in
the student body.
28. It was only Justice Powell who favored this approach. Four Justices,
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more than that a university's interest in achieving a racially diverse
student body justifies the "competitive consideration of race and
ethnic origin" in making admissions decisions. While the matter
of "racial diversity" could be relevant in other contexts, such as
the teaching staff of a university or a public school, Bakke itself
only dealt with admissions. It is not dispositive of a future case
involving a different aspect of the "racial diversity" interest.
In his Bakke opinion, Justice Powell drew a sharp distinction
between the interest in remedying the present effects of "societal
discrimination," which he found to be insufficient, and the interest
in remedying the present effects of a governmental body's own
identified past racial discrimination, which he found to be "com-
pelling." As he stated: "The State certainly has a legitimate and
substantial interest in ameliorating, or eliminating where feasible,
the disabling effects of identified discrimination." 29 This is the one
point on which the Court institutionally has been able to agree.
As Justice O'Connor has put it: "The Court is in agreement that,
whatever the formulation employed, remedying past or present
racial discrimination by a state actor is a sufficiently weighty state
interest to warrant the remedial use of a carefully constructed
affirmative action program." 0 However, as we will see in the
discussion of Croson, state and local governments seeking to justify
racial preference on this basis must have a "substantial basis in
evidence" for finding the existence of past discrimination against
blacks and any other included racial-ethnic minority. Additionally,
governments may be required to show that race-neutral means will
not be sufficient to achieve the remedial racial objective. 31
Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, would have preferred to rest the
decision on the university's interest in overcoming the present consequences of
societal discrimination, while four others, Stevens, Burger, Rehnquist and Stewart,
wanted to hold the university's race-conscious admissions program violative of
Title VI. 438 U.S. at 411-21.
29. Id. at 307.
30. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 286 (1986) (O'Connor,
J.), reh'g denied, 478 U.S. 1014 (1986).
31. While the Court has upheld the power of the federal courts to order
the implementation of a racially preferential hiring or promotional plan to remedy
an employer's identified past discrimination, there is sharp disagreement over
how much justification is required for the imposition of such a remedy. See
Local 28, Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421 (1986); United
States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987). It may be that a majority of the Court,
especially with the departure of Justice Brennan, will now hold that direct racial
remediation ordinarily is not an appropriate means of overcoming the past
discrimination. Instead, the Court will have to use other means, such as an
injunction against racial discrimination, the affirmative recruitment of minority
workers, and a monitoring of hiring practices.
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In any event, by recognizing that (1) a public university's
interest in achieving a racially diverse student body and (2) a
governmental body's interest in overcoming the present conse-
quences of its own identified past discrimination are "compelling
governmental interests," justifying the precisely tailored use of
race-conscious criteria, the Court institutionally has refused to
make the value judgment in favor of racial neutrality. From an
institutional standpoint, then, the Court has held that for certain
purposes and in some circumstances, racial preference is consti-
tutionally permissible and, in this sense, has rejected an overriding
principle of racial neutrality. This institutional position was reaf-
firmed in Metro Broadcasting,32 where five Justices upheld the
constitutionality of the Congressionally mandated racial preferences
at issue.
In Fullilove v. Klutznick,33 decided in 1980, the Court found
the "easier way out" in the "power of Congress." There the
Court, in a 6-3 decision, upheld a 10% minority business enterprise
set aside mandated in a Congressional grant to state and local
governments for public works projects. The "compelling" interest
involved was overcoming the present consequences of identified
past racial discrimination against minority contractors in the award-
ing of government construction contracts. Chief Justice Burger's
plurality opinion, joined by Justices White and Powell, emphasized
the broad power of Congress to find identified past racial discrim-
ination and to take appropriate action to remedy it.
The legislation contained no preambulary findings of past
discrimination, but Burger deemed this omission unimportant. He
noted that Congress "may legislate without compiling the kind of
'record' appropriate with respect to judicial or administrative
proceedings," and found that Congress had abundant historical
basis from which it could conclude that traditional procurement
practices, when applied to minority businesses, could perpetuate
the effects of prior discrimination. 34 Burger emphasized Congress'
broad powers under section 5 of the fourteenth amendment. Sec-
tion 5, he said, "is a positive grant of legislative power authorizing
Congress to exercise its discretion in determining whether and what
legislation is .needed to secure the guarantees of the Fourteenth
Amendment," and, as a result, "[i]n no organ of government,
state or federal, does there repose a more comprehensive remedial
32. 110 S. Ct. 2997 (1990).
33. 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
34. Id. at 477-78.
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power than in the Congress, expressly charged by the Constitution
with competence and authority to enforce the equal protection
guarantees. '35 Burger also indicated that the Court should give
deference to the Congressional determination that the particular
form of racial preference was an appropriate means of accomplish-
ing Congress' remedial objective.16
Justice Powell concurred separately in order to apply the
"compelling governmental interest" test to the set-aside. In his
application of this test, he too emphasized the power of Congress
to make findings of past discrimination on a nationwide basis and
to select the particular means for remedying the effects of that
discrimination.3 7 Justices Marshall, Brennan and Blackmun applied
the "substantial and important relationship" test as per the Bren-
nan opinion in Bakke,38 and found that "the racial classifications
employed ... are substantially related to the achievement of the
important and congressionally articulated goal of remedying the
present effects of past racial discrimination. ' 39
In Fulilove the "power of Congress" rationale enabled the
Court institutionally to uphold the racial preference at issue in
that case. Burger could sustain the preference on this basis without
giving support to the use of racial preference by state and local
governments. White, who is a strong proponent of federal power
in a number of contexts, 40 likewise, could join with Burger and
35. Id. at 476, 483. (Burger, C.J.).
36. "[D]oubts must be resolved in support of the congressional judgment
that this limited program is a necessary step to effectuate the constitutional
mandate for equality of economic opportunity." Id. at 489.
37. As to the latter point, he stated: "I believe that Congress' choice of a
remedy should be upheld, however, if the means selected are equitable and
reasonably necessary to the redress of identified discrimination. Such a test allows
the Congress to exercise necessary discretion but preserves the essential safeguard
of judicial review of racial classifications." Id. at 510.
38. 438 U.S. at 325, 358-62. See supra notes 15-16, and accompanying text.
39. 448 U.S. at 521. Justice Stewart, joined by then Justice Rehnquist,
dissented, as did Justice Stevens. The Stevens dissent reflects a hostility to minority
business enterprise set-asides, indicating his view that they are overinclusive as
applied beyond black-owned firms and counter productive to the objective of
increasing governmental contracting opportunities for black-owned firms. Id. at
522-54 (Stevens, J., dissenting.) It is noteworthy that he voted to strike down
the minority business enterprise set-aside in Croson as well.
40. In the Court's just-concluded Term, for example, he authored the
majority opinion in Missouri v. Jenkins, 110 S. Ct. 1651 (1990). Jenkins upheld
the broad powers of federal courts to impose effective desegregation plans,
including directing a school board to impose taxes, contrary to state law, where
1198 [Vol. 36:1187
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Powell in upholding the set-aside on this basis, and implicitly move
away from the "societal discrimination" justification that was the
foundation of the Brennan opinion that he joined in Bakke. Powell
could relate the "power of Congress" rationale to the "compelling
governmental interest" standard that he so strongly advocated in
Bakke: Congress could use its power to make generalized findings
of past discrimination on a nationwide basis and to select the
particular means for remedying the effects of that discrimination.
Brennan, Marshall and Blackmun could supply the votes necessary
for a judgment upholding the constitutionality of the set-aside
while adhering to the "important and substantial relationship"
standard of the Brennan opinion in Bakke. The end result again
was for the Court to go no further than was necessary to uphold
the particular racial preference in issue.
The next case to come before the Court, Wygant v. Jackson
Board of Education4' decided in 1986, was much more difficult
and did not lend itself to an "easier way out." The end result
was a fragmented Court, and a 5-4 decision invalidating the
particular racial preference involved in that case, but leaving
unanswered two questions on which only a plurality had expressed
an opinion. At issue in Wygant was a collective bargaining agree-
ment between a school board and the teacher's union, providing
for race-based out-of-line seniority layoffs to maintain the current
level of black teachers in the system. Beginning in 1969, the school
board, which had an increasing number of black students but very
few black teachers, adopted an affirmative hiring plan, establishing
a goal of 15% black faculty in each school building. The affir-
mative hiring plan succeeded in increasing the number of black
teachers in the system. To ensure that the hiring gains would not
be eroded by anticipated layoffs, in 1972 the school board and
the union adopted a provision in the collective bargaining agree-
ment providing for race-based out-of-line seniority layoffs. Under
this provision, while teachers would still be laid off in reverse
seniority order within each building, black teachers would not be
laid off at a percentage rate greater than their percentage repre-
sentation in the school system prior to layoff. The collective
bargaining agreement thus preserved the benefits of the hiring
necessary to implement a constitutionally-required desegregation plan. As he there
noted, "state policy must give way when it operates to hinder vindication of
federal constitutional guarantees." Id. at 1666 (quoting North Carolina State Bd.
of Educ. v. Swam, 402 U.S. 43, 45 (1971)).
41. 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
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gains during layoff, but at the expense of identified individual
white teachers who were laid off despite having greater seniority
than some black teachers who were retained.
The situation in Wygant demonstrated most cogently how racial
preference for blacks can produce unfairness to individual whites.
Since identified individual white teachers suffered race-based out-
of-line seniority layoffs, they bore the entire burden of the school
board's efforts to achieve a racially diverse faculty. In this sense,
the burden was focused rather than diffused. In his plurality
opinion in Wygant, Justice Powell contrasted this situation with
race-based hiring goals, noting that layoffs disrupt settled expec-
tations in a way that hiring goals did not: "[H]iring goals impose
a diffuse burden, often foreclosing only one of several opportu-
nities, layoffs impose the entire burden of achieving racial equality
on particular individuals, often resulting in serious disruption of
their lives. g" 42 In Wygant, identified white individuals suffered a
loss of settled expectations and were compelled to bear the entire
burden of "faculty diversification." Much more so than in Bakke
and Fullilove,43 the unfairness to individual whites in Wygant
strongly militated against the Court's upholding the racial prefer-
ence in issue.
The second difficulty in Wygant was the lack of a consistently
articulated justification for the racial preference. When the school
board adopted the affirmative hiring plan in 1969, its objective
was simply to increase the number of black teachers in response
to an increasing black student enrollment." Jackson is a small city
in south-central Michigan, and in the 1960's had an increasing
black population. By 1968, 15% of its students were black, but it
42. As he forthrightly stated: "Denial of a future employment opportunity
is not as intrusive as loss of an existing job." Id. at 282-83.
43. The race-based admissions policy in Bakke meant only that a white
applicant disadvantaged thereby would be unable to attend a particular school,
and the minority set-aside for governmental procurement in Fulilove meant only
that a non-minority enterprise disadvantaged thereby was unable to bid on a
particular contract.
44. Experience throughout the Nation indicates that black teachers are
employed almost entirely in school systems with substantial black student enroll-
ments. Because the black population, especially outside the South, is concentrated
primarily in the central cities of major metropolitan areas, most school systems
outside the central cities have virtually no black students and correspondingly
virtually no black teachers. It is only when there is some substantial black
population movement into these systems that there is any concern with increasing
the number of black teachers.
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had only 4% black teachers. 45 The affirmative hiring plan was
adopted in response to racial tension in the community and the
school system. The school board had made no finding that it had
engaged in identified past discrimination against black teachers,
and such a finding would have been difficult to sustain.4
The most typical justification for increasing the number of
black teachers in a school system with an increasing number of
black students is that black teachers are necessary to serve as "role
models" for the black students. The "role model" objective is
analytically quite different from the "faculty diversification" ob-
jective. A racially integrated faculty, just as a racially integrated
student body, can provide a different kind of educational experi-
ence, for white students as well as black students. Justice Stevens
made this point very strongly in Wygant:
In the context of public education, it is quite obvious
that a school board may reasonably conclude that an
integrated faculty will be able to provide benefits to the
student body that could not be provided by an all-white,
or nearly all-white, faculty. For one of the most important
lessons that the American public schools teach is that the
diverse ethnic, cultural, and national backgrounds that have
been brought together in our famous 'melting pot' do not
identify essential differences among the human beings that
inhabit our land. It is one thing for a white child to be
taught by a white teacher that color, like beauty, is only
'skin deep'; it is far more convincing to experience that
truth on a day to day basis during the routine, ongoing
learning process. 47
Likewise, in Wygant, Justice O'Connor emphasized that "[t]he
goal of providing 'role models' discussed by the courts below
should not be confused with the very different goal of promoting
racial diversity among the faculty."4 The problem in Wygant was
that the school board did not articulate the "faculty diversifica-
45. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 746 F.2d 1152, 1156 (6th Cir. 1984).
46. In all probability, not very many black teachers had applied for jobs
in the Jackson system, either because they did not want to teach there, or because
they knew that they would not be hired in a school system that had very few
black students.
47. 476 U.S. at 315 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
48. Id. at 288 n.*.
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tion" justification when it adopted the hiring plan, and in the
courts below it essentially argued the "role model" justification.
In fact, it did not fully articulate the "faculty diversification"
justification until the case came before the Supreme Court.
The third important problem in Wygant was that there was
simply no record at all. The case was disposed of by the federal
district court on cross-motions for summary judgment, and the
"statement of facts" that the parties had proffered in support of
their cross-motions was rather imprecise. Both parties submitted
voluminous "lodgings" to the Supreme Court, and the school
board claimed that the "lodgings" supported a finding of identified
past discrimination. However, the school board had not made such
a finding, and it did not argue in the courts below that the plan
was adopted to remedy its own identified past discrimination.
The five Justice majority expressed itself in three separate
opinions. The Powell opinion, joined in completely by Burger and
Rehnquist and in part by O'Connor, made two points. First, the
"societal discrimination" and "role model" justifications were
insufficient to sustain any racial preference.4 9 Justice O'Connor
joined this part of the opinion. Second, it was not necessary to
consider whether the case should be remanded to enable the school
board to make a showing of identified past discrimination because,
whatever the justification, a provision for race-based out-of-line
seniority layoffs was constitutionally impermissibles0 Justice White
limited his brief concurrence to the constitutional impermissibility
of the layoff provision.5 1 Thus, there were four votes on the Court
for holding that race-based out-of-line seniority layoffs could not
be used to advance any purpose, including overcoming the present
effects of a governmental body's own identified past discrimina-
tion.
Justice O'Connor, in her concurrence, found it unnecessary to
resolve this specific question. She emphasized that the govern-
mental body has an "unquestionably compelling interest" in rem-
edying the present effects of its identified past discrimination, and
that it can make a showing of past discrimination when the plan
is challenged in court by adversely affected whites.5 2 In the present
case, however, neither the district court nor the court of appeals
made "the proper inquiry into the legitimacy of the Board's
49. Id. at 274-76.
50. Id. at 282-84.
51. Id. at 294-95.
52. Id. at 289-91.
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asserted remedial purpose; instead they relied upon governmental
purposes ['societal discrimination' and 'role models'] that we have
deemed insufficient to withstand strict scrutiny, and therefore failed
to isolate a sufficiently important governmental purpose that could
support the challenged provision. ' 5 3
In any event, the layoff provision was not "narrowly tailored
to achieve its asserted remedial purpose," because it was keyed to
a hiring goal "that itself has no relation to- the remedying of
employment discrimination. ' 54 The hiring goal was keyed to the
percentage of black students in the school system rather than to
the percentage of qualified black teachers within the relevant labor
pool, which is the benchmark for measuring and remedying the
present consequences of identified past discrimination.5 5 O'Connor
thus left open in Wygant the question of whether a race-based
out-of-line seniority provision is constitutionally permissible as a
means of preserving the goals of a hiring plan adopted to remedy
proven identified past discrimination.
Justice Marshall, joined by Justices Brennan and Blackmun,
argued that the Court should not have decided the constitutional
issues in the posture in which they were presented, and should
have remanded the case for findings as to the existence of identified
past discrimination.m They also indicated their view that the "fac-
ulty diversification" justification was constitutionally sufficient. 57
Thirdly, they took the position that the race-based out-of-line
seniority plan at issue here, which laid off teachers in reverse order
of seniority, while maintaining existing racial percentages, was a
constitutionally permissible means of advancing both the overcom-
ing of identified past discrimination and "faculty diversification"
interests.5 The Stevens dissent focused entirely on the "faculty
diversification" interest and agreed with Marshall, Brennan and
Blackmun that the layoff provision was a constitutionally permis-
sible means of advancing that interest.5 9
The end result of the Court's fragmentation in Wygant left
undecided both a question as to the remedying of identified past
discrimination, and a question as to achieving "faculty diversifi-
53. Id. at 293.
54. Id. at 294.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 296, 312.
57. Id. at 306.
58. Id. at 309-12.
59. Id. at 313-20.
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cation" in a public school system. The answer that would be given
by the Court to the first question, even without regard to the
replacement of Brennan, is indicated by the positions taken by the
Justices in subsequent cases. I have no doubt that O'Connor would
now hold that a race-based out-of-line seniority layoff is a consti-
tutionally impermissible means of advancing any asserted govern-
mental interest, including maintaining hiring goals under a plan
designed to remedy the governmental body's identified past dis-
crimination. It may safely be assumed that Scalia and Kennedy,
who have both expressed strong opposition to any form of racial
preference, would hold this unconstitutional as well. Additionally,
since Rehnqulst and White held this unconstitutional in Wygant,
there are now at least five votes on the Court for holding uncon-
stitutional any race-based out-of-line seniority layoff adopted for
any purpose.
I should add that I now find myself in agreement with this
position.60 When the government is purportedly trying to remedy
its own identified past discrimination (and certainly when it is
acting to achieve "faculty diversification"), a cogent argument can
be made that the costs of this effort should be borne by the
government itself, and that it should not be achieved by destroying
the "settled expectations" of particular and identified individual
whites. To put it another way, in the constitutional equation, the
conflict between the ideals of racial equality and racial neutrality
may in some circumstances have to be resolved by imposing the
cost burden on the involved governmental entity.
When the government has engaged in identified past racial
discrimination it has violated the interests of blacks as a group.
For example, when a city in the past has discriminated in the
hiring of its police officers, it has violated the interests of its black
citizenry in the equal participation in this very important aspect
of municipal government. The city, then, has an affirmative con-
60. In Wygant, I was one of the lawyers on the amicus curiae brief filed
by the Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights Under Law and the American Civil
Liberties Union on behalf of the school board. My primary concern was that
the Court would uphold the use of race-conscious criteria to advance the "faculty
diversification" interest in the posture of that case, however, it seemed to me
likely-as indeed it turned out-that if the Court invalidated the race-based out-
of-line seniority layoff, it would not at the same time specifically uphold the
"faculty diversification" interest. Under the collective bargaining agreement in
Wygant, layoff did not always follow strict seniority, and we argued that the use
of race could be sustained as one factor affecting the layoff determination. Still,
I was troubled with that part of the argument in Wygant.
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stitutional duty to remedy the present consequences of its identified
past discrimination, and thus in a suit by adversely affected black
citizens, it can be ordered to adopt an affirmative racial hiring
and, or, promotion plan.61 When it voluntarily adopts a race-based
hiring or promotions plan to remedy its own identified past dis-
crimination, it is only doing what it is constitutionally required to
do. Thus, it can defend the plan in a suit by adversely affected
white officers by showing that it had a "substantial basis in
evidence" for concluding that it had engaged in identified past
discrimination against blacks. 62
If the city wants to engage in a layoff of police officers before
the judicially mandated or voluntarily adopted racial hiring goals
have been reached, it can be contended that using in-line seniority
layoffs, resulting in the layoffs of black officers, violates the city's
affirmative duty to remedy its identified past discrimination. If
this contention is sustained, then the city would be precluded from
laying off the black officers, and thus would have to bear the
costs of remedying its own constitutional violation. 63 By the same
token, since the city can properly be expected to bear the costs of
remedying its own constitutional violation, it should be precluded
from using race-based out-of-line seniority layoffs to lay off white
officers instead. Here, to paraphrase Justice Powell in Wygant,
the city is "imposing the entire burden of [remedying the govern-
ment's constitutional violation] on particular individuals, often
resulting in serious disruption of their lives." 4
In other words, when a governmental body has engaged in
identified past discrimination against blacks, an argument can be
made that the Constitution should require it to bear the costs of
remedying its own constitutional violation and preclude it from
shifting the costs of remediation to: (1) blacks as a group by laying
off the black officers it has hired to remedy its constitutional
violation; or (2) particular individual whites by using race-based
out-of-line seniority layoffs.
61. See The Constitution, supra note 3, at 699-703. For illustrative cases
see United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987); United States v. City of
Chicago, 549 F.2d 415 (7th Cir. 1977), on remand, 437 F. Supp. 256 (N.D. Ill.
1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 932 (1978); NAACP v. Allen, 493 F.2d 614 (5th
Cir. 1974).
62. See e.g., Detroit Police Officers Ass'n v. Young, 608 F.2d 671 (6th
Cir. 1979).
63. See The Constitution, supra note 3, at 703.
64. 476 U.S. at 283.
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The second question left unanswered in Wygant is whether a
school board or a university's interest in maintaining "faculty
diversification"65 is a sufficient interest to justify the use of racial
considerations in hiring, such as by way of a "racial enhancement"
factor, as per the Powell opinion in Bakke. The question is not
answered by Wygant, since only four Justices-Brennan, who has
now left the .Court, Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens-held that
this was a valid interest. The remaining Justices did not pass on
the question. I think that White would agree that this interest is
sufficient, since he found the "racial diversity" of the student
body interest sufficient in Bakke and has never indicated any
repudiation of his position in that case. Based on her statements
in Wygant, I thought that Justice O'Connor might agree that this
interest is sufficient, but the hostility to any use of racial preference
in her Metro Broadcasting dissent makes her concurrence on this
point questionable. At this point in time then, it cannot be said
for certain that there would be at least five votes on the Court to
uphold this limited use of racial preference in order to achieve
"faculty diversification." The question, thus, must be considered
an open one for now, although a lower court, in reliance on
Bakke, could justifiably find such use of racial preference to be
constitutionally permissible.
In City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Company,6 decided in
1989, the Court, again, dealt with minority business enterprise set-
asides, this time those adopted by a local governmental body. In
the wake of Fullilove, many state and local governmental bodies
adopted minority contractor construction set-aside programs, re-
lying primarily on Congress' finding of industry-wide discrimina-
tion in Fullilove. In retrospect, Croson was a very unsympathetic
case for an institutionally ambivalent Court to sustain the racial
preference at issue. Minority business enterprise set-aside programs
directly benefit minority business persons, who are among the
more advantaged and politically influential segments of the mi-
nority community. While I maintain that such programs advance
a strong societal interest in the equal participation of blacks in the
American economic system and redound to the benefit of the entire
black community,67 they may appear to some Members of the
Court as a "windfall" for more advantaged and influential blacks.
65. The school board or university asserting such an interest will explain it
in terms of "faculty diversification" and not in terms of "role model."
66. 109 S. Ct. 706 (1989).
67. See Racial Preference, supra note 10, at 1253-57.
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I find it interesting, for example, that Justice Stevens, who voted
to sustain race-based out-of-line seniority layoffs to advance the
"faculty diversification" interest in Wygant, voted to hold uncon-
stitutional the minority business enterprise set-aside in Croson, just
as he did in Fullilove.
Second, a number of American cities, such as Richmond, now
have black majorities and thus are very likely to adopt such
programs. In Croson, Justice O'Connor, in justifying the appli-
cation of "strict scrutiny" to the use of the racial preference,
noted that blacks comprised approximately fifty percent of the
Richmond population and that five of the nine seats on City
Council were held by blacks. Thus, she c6ncluded that "[tihe
concern that a political majority will more easily act to the dis-
advantage of a minority based on unwarranted assumptions or
incomplete facts would seem to militate for, not against, the
application of heightened judicial scrutiny in this case. ' 69 Likewise,
Justice Scalia noted that in Richmond the set-aside "was directly
beneficial to the dominant political group, which happens also to
be the dominant racial group." He said that the same thing had
doubtless happened in practice in other cities, with blacks "on the
receiving end of the injustice." But, said Justice Scalia, "Where
injustice is the game, turn-about is not fair play."170
Third, while the minority population of Richmond is almost
entirely black, the terms of the set-aside were borrowed from the
federal government's classification of "minority," which also in-
cluded "Spanish-speaking, Oriental, Indian, Eskimo or Aleut per-
sons." If there was past racial discrimination in Richmond's
procurement policies, it certainly was against black enterprises,
and the limited evidence of past discrimination that the city pre-
68. As he stated in Croson: "The justification for the ordinance is the fact
that in the past white contractors-and presumably other white citizens in
Richmond-have discriminated against black contractors. The class of persons
benefited by the ordinance is not, however, limited to victims of such discrimi-
nation; it encompasses persons who have never been in business in Richmond as
well as minority contractors who may have been guilty of discriminating against
members of other minority groups. Indeed, for all the record shows, all of the
minority-business enterprises that have benefited from the ordinance may be firms
that have prospered notwithstanding the discriminatory conduct that may have
harmed other minority firms years ago. Ironically, minority firms that have
survived in the competitive struggle rather than those that have perished, are
most likely to benefit from an ordinance of this kind." 109 S. Ct. at 732-33.
69. Id. at 722.
70. Id. at 737.
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sented related entirely to black enterprises. In Richmond, other
racial-ethnic groups were mindlessly included in the preference. In
some other cities, minority groups such as Hispanics and Asian
Americans, which are small in numbers compared to the black
population, are also included for political reasons. The inclusion
of groups as to which there is no evidence at all of identified past
discrimination impairs the legitimacy of the racial preference for
black enterprises. As Justice O'Connor stated in Croson: "The
random inclusion of racial groups that, as a practical matter, may
never have suffered from discrimination in the construction indus-
try in Richmond, suggests that perhaps the city's purpose was not
in fact to remedy past discrimination. '71
Finally, the city tried to justify the program as being necessary
to overcome the present consequences of both "societal discrimi-
nation" and its own identified past discrimination, but had made
no findings as to its own past discrimination and presented very
limited evidence of such discrimination in the lower court. The
only evidence of past discrimination against black enterprises in
the award of governmental construction contracts was that (1)
supporters of the Richmond set-aside stated that there had been
discrimination in the construction industry, (2) minorities made up
fifty percent of the city's population, but had received less than
one percent of the city's prime contracts, (3) state and local
contractors' associations had a very small population of minority
contractors, and (4) as brought out in Fufiilove, Congress had
determined in 1977 that nationally, minority participation in the
construction industry had been hindered by the effects of past
discrimination. 72
It was a relatively easy matter for the Court majority to find
the Richmond set-aside program unconstitutional under existing
doctrine and precedents. Since the Court has never held that
remedying "societal discrimination" justifies racial preference, the
only valid interest that could be asserted here was remedying the
city's own identified past discrimination, and the city's evidence
on that score was weak. O'Connor readily concluded that "[iun
sum, none of the evidence presented by the city points to any
identified discrimination in the Richmond construction industry." 7 3
She discounted conclusionary statements that such discrimination
existed as having "little probative value" and observed that since
71. Id. at 728.
72. Id. at 724.
73. Id. at 727.
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"special qualifications" were required for the award of contracts,
a gross statistical disparity between the black percentage of the
city's population and the percentage of contracts awarded to black
firms was misplaced. To demonstrate a discriminatory exclusion
of black firms, the relevant statistical pool had to be the qualified
black contractors. In Croson, the city did not even know how
many black firms in the relevant market area were qualified to
perform the prime or subcontracting work for the city's construc-
tion contracts or the percentage of total city construction dollars
the minority firms currently were receiving for subcontracting when
in the city's prime contracts.74
What the city was essentially relying on, of course, as had
other cities and the states that adopted minority business enterprise
construction set-asides, was Congress' findings of industry-wide
discrimination against minority contractors that was the basis of
the set-aside upheld in Fullilove. The crucial holding in Croson
was that these findings could not be relied upon to uphold minority
business enterprise set-asides adopted by states and local govern-
ments. Justice O'Connor first noted that these findings had ex-
tremely limited probative value for demonstrating the existence of
discrimination in a particular city, since Congress' inclusion of the
waiver provision in the program explicitly recognized that "the
scope of the problem would vary from market area to market
area."I75 More significantly, while Congress can make generalized
findings of discrimination under its section 5 powers, the states
"must identify that discrimination, public or private, with some
specificity before they may use race-conscious relief."176
The O'Connor opinion, joined in on this point by Rehnquist,
White and Kennedy, and by Scalia in his separate opinion, also
reaffirmed that the "strict scrutiny" of the "compelling govern-
mental interest" standard applied to the use of race-conscious
74. Id. at 724-25.
75. Id. at 726.
76. Id. at 727. The city also argued, in reliance on Fullilove, that it need
not make specific findings of discrimination in order to engage in race-conscious
relief. In rejecting this argument, O'Connor emphasized that, "Congress, unlike
any State or political subdivision, has a specific constitutional mandate to enforce,
the dictates of the Fourteenth Amendment," and that to allow the states to
"identify and redress the effects of society-wide discrimination" would "be
contrary to the intentions of the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment who
desired to place clear limits on the States' use of race as a criterion for legislative
action and to have the federal courts enforce those limitations." Id. at 719.
1990] 1209
THE WAYNE LAW REVIEW
criteria favoring racial minorities.7 7 Although not necessary to the
decision of the case, O'Connor indicated that there may be "ap-
propriate means" problems with the use of a minority business
enterprise set-aside even to remedy identified past discrimination.
First, she noted that there was no evidence that the city had
considered the use of race-neutral means to increase minority
business participation in city contracting. She said that many of
the barriers to minority participation in the construction industry
appeared to be race-neutral, such as the lack of capital or inability
to meet bonding requirements and thus, the city was incorrect to
rely on these barriers as a justification for use of race-conscious
classifications. If the city were to act on these barriers, such as
by a race-neutral program of city financing for small firms, this
would "a fortiori, lead to greater minority participation. 78 Sec-
ond, the rigid racial quota appeared to involve nothing more than
"racial balancing." There was no effort to determine whether a
particular minority firm had suffered from the effects of the past
discrimination. Since successful firms would participate fully in
the program, it was not "narrowly tailored to remedy the effects
of prior discrimination. '79
The thrust of Croson then is that states and local governments
may adopt minority business enterprise set-aside programs only to
remedy the present consequences of identified past discrimination
for which they were responsible, 0 and that they must have a
"strong basis in evidence" for finding the existence of such past
discrimination. Even if this burden is satisfied, there still may be
questions of whether racial preference is justified at all if race-
neutral means might be effective, and of what kinds of minority
firms may receive the preference. As a result of Croson, the
constitutional barriers to the adoption of minority business enter-
prise set-asides by states and local governments are formidable.
What is very interesting, however, is how O'Connor in Part V
of her opinion, which is expressly joined in by Rehnquist, White
and Kennedy, and Scalia in his separate opinion, proceed to tell
states and local governments how they can increase contracting
77. Id. 720-23. Scalia, however, was not willing to concede that racial
preference could be used even to remedy the government's own identified past
racial discrimination. Id. at 735-39.
78. Id. at 728 (emphasis in original).
79. Id. at 729.
80. This includes discrimination against minority firms by private entities
holding government contracts. Id. at 720.
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opportunities for racial minorities in a race-neutral and thus con-
stitutionally permissible way."' As O'Connor states: "Even in the
absence of evidence of discrimination, the city has at its disposal
a whole array of race-neutral devices to increase the accessibility
of city contracting opportunities to small entrepreneurs of all
races."' 82 These include "simplification of bidding procedures, re-
laxation of bonding requirements, ... training and financial aid
for 'disadvantaged entrepreneurs of all races,' and prohibiting
discrimination in the provision of credit or bonding by local
suppliers and banks." As she concludes: "Business as usual should
not mean business pursuant to the unthinking exclusion of certain
members of our society from its rewards." 3
Scalia picks up the theme in his separate opinion and makes
the point that as long as the basis for a preference is race-neutral,
it does not matter, for constitutional purposes, that blacks will
benefit disproportionately from the preference. He suggests that
in the field of governmental contracting, the state "may adopt a
preference for small businesses, or even for new businesses, which
would make it easier for those previously excluded by discrimi-
nation to enter the field." '  He goes on to say, "Such programs
may well have racially disproportionate impact, but they are not
based on race." 85 He later adds:
Since blacks have been disproportionately disadvantaged
by racial discrimination, any race-neutral remedial pro-
grams aimed at the disadvantaged as such will have a
disproportionately beneficial impact on blacks. Only such
a program, and not one that operates on the basis of race,
is in accord with the letter and the spirit of our Constitu-
tion.8 6
81. O'Connor also emphasizes that they can stop present discrimination. If
they have evidence that non-minority contractors systematically exclude minority
businesses from subcontracting opportunities, they can end the discriminatory
exclusion. They can also take remedial action based on an inference of discrim-
inatory exclusion if they find a significant statistical disparity between the number
of available qualified minority contractors for a particular service and the number
actually engaged by the city or its prime contractors. Id. at 729.
82. Id. at 729 (emphasis added).
83. Id. at 730.
84. Id. at 738.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 739 (emphasis in original).
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At least five Members of the Court, O'Connor, Rehnquist,
White, Scalia and Kennedy, appear to be saying that governmental
bodies should try to overcome the present consequences of the
social history of racism by the use of race-neutral policies that are
intended to and will have the effect of disproportionately benefiting
blacks. As Scalia emphasizes, as long as the policies are expressed
in terms of race-neutral criteria, and whites meeting those criteria
receive the benefits of the policies, there is no constitutional
problem.8 7
The Court's holding in Croson, coupled with Part V of the
O'Connor opinion and the Scalia opinion, sends a very clear
"behavioral message" to state and local governmental units that
want to increase minority participation in governmental contract-
ing. The first part of the "behavioral message" is: Don't use race-
based set-asides or other forms of racial preference. The second
part of the "behavioral message" is: Increasing minority partici-
pation in governmental contracting is a socially desirable policy
objective, which you should achieve by race-neutral means, in
particular, means directed at increasing the participation of small
businesses. In this connection, the Court is also saying: You may
also adopt criteria that will ensure that minority business enterprises
will benefit, even disproportionately, to white-owned business en-
terprises.
In light of this "behavioral message," if I were advising a
state or local governmental unit seeking to increase minority par-
ticipation in governmental contracting, I would advise it to adopt
a preference for locally owned small businesses. "Small business"
should be defined to include as many of the minority-owned
businesses as possible in the particular area. The size of the
preference should be large enough to give minority-owned busi-
nesses substantially the same amount of business they would have
received under a minority business enterprise set-aside. Also, it
should include white-owned firms who qualify under the designated
criteria. Of course, such a preference imposes additional procure-
ment costs. There will be a substantial increase in the proportion
of contracts which will go into a "sheltered market" rather than
be subject to completely competitive bidding. The governmental
body will have to make a political judgment as to the cost it is
87. Apparently this means that for constitutional purposes, the policies
would not be considered to amount to intentional racial discrimination, despite
the racial motivation, because whites meeting the expressed criteria would also
be entitled to the benefits.
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willing to bear in order to achieve this objective, but that is
another matter. Particularly where cities are involved, the definition
of "locally owned" can be tied to the definition of "small busi-
ness" so as to maximize the number of minority firms that will
be included in the preference (given the concentration of the
minority population in the central cities, most minority firms are
likely to be "locally owned" in this circumstance). The Court has
made it clear that this kind of "race-neutral" preference is con-
stitutionally permissible."8 This race-neutral preference is certainly
the safest course for state and local governmental units to follow
if they wish to increase governmental contracting opportunities for
minority firms.
Metro Broadcasting
In Metro Broadcasting,9 the Court dealt with two forms of
minority preference, adopted by the FCC in its 1978 Statement of
Policy on Minority Ownership of Broadcasting Facilities, that were
designed to increase the exceedingly small percentage of minority-
owned broadcasting facilities.9 Under the "minority enhancement"
policy, the FCC considers minority ownership as a "plus" factor
88. A classification in favor of "small businesses" is subject only to
deferential rational basis review. A governmental body clearly has a legitimate
interest in increasing the contracting opportunities for small businesses, and a
small business set-aside or "sheltered market" is rationally related to the ad-
vancement of that interest.
With regards to "resident" preference, a governmental body is constitution-
ally entitled to give preference to its own residents in the expenditure of its own
funds. Resident preference in governmental contracting is not subject to negative
commerce clause challenge, White v. Massachusetts Council of Constr. Employeis,
460 U.S. 204 (1983), and can probably survive a privileges and immunities
challenge on the ground that there is a need for the city to favor its own residents
(e.g., it has a relatively high unemployment rate). See United Bldg. Trades
Council v. Camden, 465 U.S. 208 (1984).
89. Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 110 S.
Ct. 2997 (1990).
90. The FCC used the standard federal definition of "minority" to include
Black, Hispanic Surnamed, American Eskimo, Aleut, American Indian, and
Asian American. These groups total one-fifth of the overall population. However,
in 1978, when these policies were adopted, minority groups owned less than 1%
of the Nation's radio and television stations and, in 1986, they owned just 2.1%
of the more than 11,000 stations. As late entrants, the minority broadcasters
often have been able to obtain only the less valuable stations, serving geograph-
ically limited markets with relatively small audiences, 110 S. Ct. at 3002 n.1,
3003.
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in comparative proceedings for new licenses. 91 Only a station in
which the minority owner actively participates in the day-to-day
management of the station will be eligible for this "plus" factor. 92
Under the "distress sale" policy, the FCC permits a licensee who
faces a threat of revocation or non-renewal to assign the license
to a FCC-approved minority firm. The assignee must meet the
FCC's basic qualifications, the minority ownership must exceed
fifty percent or be controlling, the purchase must be made before
the start of the revocation or renewal hearing, and the purchase
price must not exceed seventy-five percent of fair market value.93
The FCC minority ownership policies have two related, but
distinct objectives, one relating to minority communities and the
other to the larger non-minority viewing and listening public. Since
it is the licensee who is ultimately responsible for identifying and
serving the needs of the licensee's audiences, one objective of the
policies is to increase programming targeted toward the interests
and needs of minority communities. The other objective is to
increase the presentation of minority views and perspectives to the
viewing and listening public.94 These objectives can be grouped
91. Id. at 3005. The other factors are: (1) diversification of control of mass
media communications; (2) the integration of ownership and management, i.e.,
full-time participation in station operation by the owners; (3) proposed program
service; (4) past broadcast record; (5) efficient use of the frequency; and (6) the
applicant's character. Id. at 3004.
There is also a "gender enhancement" policy that was not at issue in Metro
Broadcasting.
92. Id. at 3005. In Metro Broadcasting, the "minority enhancement" factor
proved decisive. The "minority credit" for Rainbow, a station that was 90%
Hispanic-owned, outweighed Metro Broadcasting's "local residence" and "civic
participation" advantage. The applicants were roughly equal on the other factors.
Id. at 3005-06. In many cases, however, the "minority enhancement" factor was
insufficient to overcome the other factors, and the minority applicant did not
receive the license. Id. at 3026 n.50.
93. Id. at 3005. In Astroline Communications v. Shurberg Broadcasting,
the companion case to Metro Broadcasting, a television station in Hartford,
Connecticut, whose license was up for a renewal hearing, was permitted to execute
a "distress sale" to Astroline, a minority firm. As a result, the FCC would not
consider Shurberg's mutually exclusive application to build a television station in
Hartford. Id. at 3007.
94. As stated in the FCC Task Force Report on Minority Ownership in
Broadcasting:
Acute underrepresentation of minorities among the owners"of broad-
casting properties is troublesome because it is the licensee who is
ultimately responsible for identifying and serving the needs of his or her
audience. Unless minorities are encouraged to enter the mainstream of
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together as "enhancing broadcast diversity." In adopting the "mi-
nority enhancement" and "distress sale" policies, the FCC nec-
essarily concluded that there was a correlation between minority
ownership and the objective of "enhancing broadcast diversity."
That is, the FCC found that minority-owned broadcasting facilities
in the aggregate would be more likely to target their programming
toward the interests and needs of minority communities and to
present minority views and perspectives to the viewing and listening
public. According to the Court majority in Metro Broadcasting,
"[t]he FCC has determined that increased minority participation
in broadcasting promotes programming diversity," and "[t]he FCC's
conclusion that there is an empirical nexus between minority own-
ership and broadcast diversity is a product of its expertise.'' 95
In 1986, the FCC undertook an inquiry into the validity of its
minority ownership policies and decided to hold in abeyance action
on licensing proceedings and "distress sales" in which a minority
preference would be dispositive. Congress intervened to protect
the policies by the use of its appropriations power. In 1987, the
continuing resolution appropriating funds for Fiscal Year 1988
provided: "That none of the funds appropriated by this Act shall
be used to repeal, to retroactively apply changes in, or to continue
reexamination of, the policies of the Federal Communications
Commission with respect to comparative licensing, distress sales
... to expand minority and women ownership of broadcasting
licenses, including those established in Statement of Policy on
Minority Ownership of Broadcast Facilities .. . ."96 Congress re-
iterated this prohibition in appropriating funds for Fiscal Year
1989 and Fiscal Year 1990. 7 As a result, Metro Broadcasting, like
Fulilove, but unlike Wygant and Croson, involved a racial pref-
erence in the programs and operations of the federal government
that was specifically authorized by Congress.98
the commercial broadcasting business, a substantial portion of our
citizenry will remain underserved and the larger, non-minority audience
will be deprived of the views of minorities.
110 S. Ct. at 3003 (quoting FCC Minority Ownership Task Force, Report on
Minority Ownership in Broadcasting 1 (1978)).
95. Id. at 3011.
96. Pub. L. No. 100-202, 101 Stat. 1329-31 (1987).
97. Pub. L. No. 100-459, 102 Stat. 2186, 2216-17 (1988); Pub. L. No. 101-
10152, 103 Stat. 1020-1021"(1990).
98. It is not disputed that Congressional policy set forth in appropriations
legislation has the same force and status as Congressional policy set forth in
other legislation. 110 S. Ct. at 3016 n.29.
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The Court then could find an "easier way out" in Metro
Broadcasting by invoking the "power of Congress" rationale that
it had employed in Fullilove. Metro Broadcasting was an even
stronger case for the "power of Congress" rationale, since here
Congress was also exercising its broad powers to regulate the
allocation of broadcasting licenses "in the public interest." Pre-
cisely because the award of broadcasting licenses involves the
allocation of scarce frequencies, Congress has the responsibility,
grounded in first amendment concerns, to ensure that the award
of a broadcasting license is in the "public interest," and that there
is the "widest possible diversity" in broadcast programming. As
the Court has stated: "The 'public interest' standard necessarily
invites reference to First Amendment principles, and, in particular,
to the First Amendment goal of achieving 'the widest possible
dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic
sources."'99
Likewise, for constitutional purposes, the interest of the listen-
ing and viewing public is far more significant than the interest of
the holder of a broadcast license. Broadcasters are "fiduciaries for
the public,"0'' and "the people as a whole retain their interest in
free speech by radio, [and other forms of broadcast] and their
collective right to have the medium function consistently with the
ends and purposes of the First Amendment."''1 1 Thus, "Congress
may ... seek to assure that the public receives through this
medium a balanced presentation of information on issues of public
importance that otherwise might not be addressed if control of
the medium were left entirely in the hands of those who own and
operate broadcasting stations." 102 Because of Congress' broad power
to regulate broadcasting "in the public interest" and to ensure the
promotion of diversity of viewpoint, it may impose access and
"fair presentation" requirements on broadcasting 0 3 that may not
under the first amendment be imposed on newspapers °"
99. FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775, 795
(1978) (citation omitted).
100. FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364, 377 (1984).
101. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969). "[I]t is
the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of broadcasters, which is
paramount."
102. 468 U.S. at 377.
103. See Red Lion, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) (upholding against first amendment
challenge the now repealed "fairness doctrine").
104. See, e.g., Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241




The broad power of Congress to regulate broadcasting "in the
public interest" and to achieve the "widest possible dissemination
of information from diverse and antagonistic sources" would surely
justify Congress' efforts to promote racial diversity in broadcast-
ing. Indeed, it would have been possible for the Court in Metro
Broadcasting to treat the case as one primarily about diversity in
broadcast programming, and only secondarily as one about racial
preference.
Totally apart from the "power of Congress" rationale, the
Court in Bakke had recognized that the interest of a public
university in achieving a racially diverse student body was "com-
pelling." If the interest in achieving "racial diversity" in a uni-
versity student body was "compelling" because it contributed to
the presentation of diverse viewpoints within the student body,
then it is difficult to see why the FCC's interest in achieving
"racial diversity" in broadcasting for the benefit of the viewing
and listening public would not be equally "compelling."' 0 5
The "power of Congress" rationale would also enable the
Court to readily find that the particular policies were an appro-
priate means of advancing the interest in "enhancing broadcast
diversity." The Court could defer to the expertise of the FCC and
the subsequent endorsement of the FCC's policies by Congress to
support the conclusion that there was a "nexus" between minority
ownership and "enhancing broadcast diversity." The FCC's insti-
tutional expertise in all facets of broadcasting would justify its
105. The premise of a "racially diverse" student body is that all students
benefit from exposure to students of different races during the educational
process. A black student can share with white students the perspective that comes
from "the experience of being black in America." See Racial Preference, supra
note 10, at 1245-48.
In the context of "enhanced broadcasting diversity," the perspective that
comes from "the experience of being black in America" relates to the broadcas-
ter's exercise of editorial discretion in programming decisions. As a result of this
experience, a black broadcaster may have a different view as to what is "impor-
tant" or "relevant" than a white broadcaster. The black broadcaster may have
a greater sensitivity to issues of discrimination or poverty. He or she may have
a better understanding of what matters may be of particular interest to black
persons and to white persons concerned with questions of equality. Likewise,
there may be greater familiarity with the work of black writers and perhaps a
different assessment of the significance of their work. The point is that precisely
because of the broadcaster's race and the different life experience and resulting
perspective that comes from being a black person in America, the black broad-
caster has something to bring to broadcast programming that is qualitatively
different from what a white broadcaster can bring.
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conclusion that a broadcasting facility that was minority owned
would be more likely to target its programming toward the interests
and needs of minority communities and would be more likely to
present minority viewpoints and perspectives to the viewing and
listening public. Likewise, while the "distress sale" policy provided
for an absolute racial preference, 106 its appropriateness could be
justified again as a matter of deference to the expertise of the
FCC and the judgment of Congress. It also applied only in a very
limited number of situations and would not seriously impair the
opportunities of non-minority firms to acquire broadcasting li-
censes.
My point then is that in Metro Broadcasting, the Court clearly
could have taken an "easier way out" by invoking the "power of
Congress" rationale of Fullilove. The Court's upholding of the
policies in issue on that basis would have had no precedential
effect for a case involving a challenge to the racial-preference
policies of states and local governments. As it turned out, five
Members of the Court were willing to go this route, but four
Members were not. The sharp division of the Court in Metro
Broadcasting may be an indication that positions on the Court
have hardened, and that the Court's seeming institutional ambiv-
alence toward the permissibility of racial preference is now the
result of a fundamental disagreement within the Court over the
basic value question of the constitutional permissibility of any
racial preference. We will come back to this point in the concluding
portion of this writing.
In Metro Broadcasting, five Justices, Brennan, White, Mar-
shall, Blackmun and Stevens, in an opinion by Justice Brennan,
and over the very strong dissents of Justice O'Connor, joined by
Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices Scalia and Kennedy (Kennedy
also wrote a brief separate opinion, joined in by Scalia), relied on
the "power of Congress" rationale to uphold both of the FCC's
minority-preference policies. More significant perhaps than the
result in the case is the way that both the majority and the dissent
dealt with the constitutional doctrine and precedent.
Ever since Bakke, Justices Brennan, Marshall and Blackmun
have insisted that the constitutional permissibility of racial-pref-
erence programs benefiting minorities-" benign" racial
106. The "minority enhancement" policy involved the same kind of consid-
eration of race as a "plus factor" that the Court had found to be an appropriate




preference"07-should be determined under the "important and
substantial relationship" standard rather than under the seemingly
more "strict" "compelling governmental interest" standard.' °8 In
Metro Broadcasting, Justices White and Stevens joined with Justices
Brennan, Marshall and Blackmun to hold that the "important and
substantial relationship" standard was the applicable standard to
determine the constitutionality of the use of racial preference
mandated or authorized by Congress in federal programs and
operations. According to the Brennan opinion, "[i]t is of overriding
significance in these cases that the FCC's minority ownership
programs have been specifically approved-indeed mandated-by
Congress."' 9 He then pointed out that in Fuilove, the Burger
opinion did not apply "strict scrutiny""10 and that he, Marshall
and Blackmun wanted to apply the "important and substantial
relationship" standard. There were now five votes on the Court
to apply that standard to the use of racial preference mandated
or authorized by Congress.
We hold that benign race-conscious measures mandated by
Congress -even if these measures are not 'remedial' in the
sense of being designed to compensate victims of past
governmental or societal discrimination-are constitution-
ally permissible to the extent that they serve important
governmental objectives within the power of Congress and
are substantially related to the achievement of those objec-
tives."'
107. See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text.
108. While Justice White joined the Brennan opinion in Bakke, he would
seem to have abandoned this position in regard to the use of racial preference
by state and local governments, since he joined the "compelling governmental
interest" part of the O'Connor opinion in Croson.
109. 110 S. Ct. at 3008-09.
110. It will be recalled that White joined the Burger opinion fully. Powell
also joined the Burger opinion, but wrote separately to sustain the racial pref-
erence under the "compelling governmental interest" standard.
111. 110 S. Ct. at 3008-09 (footnote omitted). Given the fact that Justice
White joined unreservedly in the Burger opinion in Fulilove and has generally
been supportive of the exercise of federal power, it is perhaps not surprising, in
retrospect, that he agreed to the adoption of this standard of review to determine
the validity of Congressionally approved racial preference. While Justice Stevens
dissented in Fulilove, he has generally discounted the significance of the articu-
lated standard of review in determining the constitutional permissibility of racial
preference. See Croson, 109 S. Ct. at 732-34 (Stevens, J., concurring). Since he
strongly maintains that race or ethnic origin is a valid consideration in advancing
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In her dissent, Justice O'Connor insisted that there was a
significant difference between the "compelling governmental inter-
est" standard and the "important and substantial relationship"
standard. As she stated:
The standard of review establishes whether and when the
Court and the Constitution allow the government to employ
racial classifications. A lower standard signals that the
Government may resort to racial distinctions more readily.
The Court's departure from our cases is disturbing enough,
but more disturbing still is the renewed toleration of racial
classifications that its new standard of review embodies.112
In Bakke, where the conflict over the appropriate standard of
review for "benign" racial classifications first surfaced, both Justice
Powell, who argued strongly for the "compelling governmental
interest" standard, and Justice Brennan, arguing for an "important
and substantial relationship" standard, agreed that there was a
significant difference between the two standards. Powell contended
that any classification based on race was "inherently suspect" and
therefore, was subject to "the most exacting judicial examina-
tion." ' Emphasizing that regardless of the purportedly "benign"
purpose for the racial classification, the effect was felt by an
individual. He said that when classifications "touch upon an
individual's race or ethnic background, he is entitled to a judicial
determination that the burden he is asked to bear on that basis is
precisely tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest. ' 11
4
Brennan agreed with Powell about the dangers in the use of
"benign" racial classifications and rejected the university's argu-
ment that a "benign" racial classification need pass muster only
under the "rational relationship" test. He too insisted on "strict
scrutiny," but maintained that "strict scrutiny" was being applied
under the "important and substantial relationship" standard. "[O]ur
review under the Fourteenth Amendment should be strict-not
'strict' in theory and fatal in fact, because it is stigma that causes
fatality-but strict and searching nonetheless." 11 5
the diversity objective, as brought out in his concurrence in Metro Broadcasting,
he would be readily disposed to join in the standard of review part of the
Brennan opinion. 110 S. Ct. at 3028.
112. Id. at 3033 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
113. 438 U.S. at 291.
114. Id. at 299.
115. Id. at 361-62 (footnote omitted).,
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In my own view, the difference between Powell and Brennan
over the appropriate standard of review reflects a more significant
disagreement over which governmental interests are of sufficient
importance and validity to justify the use of race-conscious criteria
favoring blacks. In Bakke, Powell maintained that overcoming
societal discrimination was not a "compelling" interest, while
Brennan maintained that it was an "important" interest. But,
Powell agreed that the university's interest in achieving a diverse
student body was "compelling." Whether that interest is labelled
"compelling" or "important," the same kind of value judgment
has to be made: that the interest is of sufficient importance and
validity to justify the resulting racial detriment to adversely affected
whites. In Bakke, Powell made that value judgment in favor of
"racial diversity" in a university's student body, and the "Brennan
four" joined with him to provide a holding on that issue.
Where the articulated standard of review may have some
independent analytical significance is in determining the question
of "appropriate means." If the articulated test is "precisely tai-
lored," the Court may give somewhat more scrutiny to the appro-
priateness of the particular use of race-conscious criteria to advance
the asserted interest than if the articulated test is "substantially
related." To put it another way, the articulated test may reflect
the degree of scrutiny that the Court will give to the particular
use of race-conscious criteria that is at issue. Under "precisely
tailored," the Court may demand a stronger showing of the
necessity of using race-conscious criteria and may consider the
availability of "less drastic" or "racially neutral" means to ad-
vance the asserted interest. For example, in Bakke, Powell said
that the university could not use race as a "surrogate" for the
likelihood of a physician's willingness to practice in currently
underserved minority communities, observing that there were more
precise and reliable ways to identify particular applicants who
would practice there." 6
In practice, however, the same showing of the necessity and
appropriateness of using the particular means of racial preference
could be required under either standard. In Bakke, Justice Powell
took the position that the "Harvard" plan-the competitive con-
116. "An applicant of whatever race who has demonstrated his concern for
disadvantaged minorities in the past and who declares that practice in such a
community is his primary professional goal would be more likely to contribute
to the alleviation of the medical shortage than 9ne who is chosen entirely on the
basis of race and disadvantage." 438 U.S. at 311.
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sideration of race and ethnic origin in the admissions process-
was "precisely tailored" to the university's "compelling" interest
in achieving a racially diverse student body. In Fulilove, he
concurred separately in order to apply the "compelling govern-
mental interest" standard to the permissibility of the Congression-
ally approved minority business enterprise set-aside and gave some
deference to Congress' choice of a particular means for remedying
the identified discrimination. When Congress acts, the question,
according to Powell, is whether the means selected are "equitable
and reasonably necessary to the redress of identified discrimina-
tion."11 7
My point then is that under either the "compelling govern-
mental interest" standard or the "important and substantial rela-
tionship" standard, the Court has to make the same kind of value
judgment as to the validity and importance of the interest asserted
to justify the use of a racial preference. As a practical matter, the
Court can give the same kind of scrutiny to the appropriateness
and necessity of the particular use of race-conscious criteria under
either standard, including some deference to Congressional judg-
ment in approving the racial preference in issue.
Interestingly enough, Justice O'Connor in Wygant, went out
of her way to downplay the difference between the Powell and
Brennan formulations of "strict scrutiny" in Bakke. She noted
that the Powell formulation "reflects the belief, apparently held
by all Members of this Court, that racial classifications of any
sort must be subject to 'strict scrutiny,' however defined."'1 She
also noted that although the Powell formulation may be viewed
as "more stringent," "the disparities between the two tests do not
preclude a fair measure of consensus," and "as regards certain
state interests commonly relied upon in formulating affirmative
action programs, the distinction between a 'compelling' and an
-'important' governmental purpose may be a negligible one."" 9
Why then does Justice O'Connor in Metro Broadcasting now
argue that the articulated standard of review does make a signif-
icant difference? And why did the majority of the Court insist on
the express adoption of the "important and substantial relation-
ship" standard, since appropriate deference could be given to FCC
117. He noted that "[s]uch a test allows the Congress to exercise necessary
discretion but preserves the essential safeguard of judicial review of racial
classifications." 448 U.S. at 510.
118. 476 U.S. at 285.
119. Id. at 286.
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and Congressional findings under the "compelling governmental
interest" standard, as per the Powell opinion in Fullilove? Addi-
tionally, why did Justice White and Justice Stevens join Justices
Brennan, Marshall and Blackmun in the adoption of the "impor-
tant and substantial relationship" standard to determine the con-
stitutional permissibility of Congressionally approved "benign"
racial preferences?
The first question is answered most easily. In O'Connor's view,
the adoption of a seemingly lower articulated standard of review
marks a "renewed toleration of racial classifications." 12° In effect,
the holding and rationale of Metro Broadcasting, coupled with the
holding of Fullilove, established as a matter of constitutional
doctrine that Congress has greater power than the states to adopt
programs of racial preference. In Metro Broadcasting, O'Connor
made very clear her strong opposition to racial preference, and
seemingly joined with Rehnquist, Scalia and Kennedy to make a
value judgment against the constitutional permissibility of virtually
any racial preference. She discussed all the objections to racial
preference, challenged the concept of a "benign" racial preference,
insisted that the interest in "enhancing broadcast diversity" clearly
is not a "compelling" one and argued that in any event this
interest could be advanced by "race-neutral" means. 121
The five Justices comprising the Metro Broadcasting majority
may have had different motivations for coming together on the
express adoption of the "important and substantial relationship"
standard. Brennan, Marshall and Blackmun have always contended
that this is the appropriate standard by which to evaluate all
"benign" racial preference, and being unable to get a Court
majority to agree with this proposition, have accepted "half a
loaf" in the adoption of this standard to evaluate Congressionally
approved racial preferences.
As we have seen in our discussion of the other cases, Justices
White and Stevens are the most ambivalent Justices on the con-
stitutional permissibility of racial preference. Of the members of
the current Court, they are the only ones who have voted to
uphold racial preferences in some cases and to invalidate them in
others. Justice White joined the Brennan opinion in Bakke to
uphold the use of racial preference to overcome the present con-
120. 110 S. Ct. at 3033.
121. Id. at 3028-37. She also contended that since the asserted interest could
be advanced by "race-neutral" means, the FCC's programs were unconstitutional
even under the "important and substantial relationship" standard. Id. at 3037.
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sequences of societal discrimination, although now he apparently
has moved away from this position. 122 He, however, is a strong
proponent of federal power,'23 and a seemingly lower standard of
review to evaluate the constitutional permissibility of Congression-
ally approved racial preference is consistent with the Burger opinion
in Fullilove, which he joined unreservedly.
Justice Stevens, however, dissented in Fulilove, and had not
indicated that there was to be any deference to Congressional use
of racial preference. But, he strongly favors the use of racial
preference to achieve racial diversity in a number of circumstances.
In his brief separate opinion in Metro Broadcasting, he noted first
that "[tioday the Court squarely rejects the proposition that a
governmental decision that rests on a racial classification is never
permissible except as a remedy for past wrong."''24 He then said
that "the Court demonstrates that this case falls within the ex-
tremely narrow category of governmental decisions for which racial
or ethnic heritage may provide a rational basis for differential
treatment." 125 Thus, he concluded: "The public interest in broad-
cast diversity-like the interest in an integrated police force, di-
versity in the composition of a public school faculty or diversity
in the student body of a professional school-is in my view
unquestionably legitimate."'"26
Stevens also says that he joins both the opinion and the
judgment of the Court. 127 Thus, he endorses the "important and
substantial relationship" test as the appropriate standard by which
to evaluate the constitutional permissibility of Congressionally
approved racial preferences, such as those involved in Fullilove.
However, he dissented in Fullilove and has indicated his opposition
to minority business enterprise set-asides. Query whether Stevens
would vote to uphold such a set-aside in another Fuiilove case. I
suspect that he might, now that he has accepted the proposition
that Congress has greater power than the states to adopt racial
preference programs.
In any event, the Court has now promulgated this proposition
as a matter of constitutional doctrine. The "important and sub-
stantial relationship" standard is the articulated basis for evaluating
122. See supra note 108.
123. See supra note 40.
124. 110 S. Ct. at 3028.
125. Id.




the constitutionality of Congressionally approved racial preference
programs. In Metro Broadcasting, the majority emphasized that
this standard applied to a racial preference adopted pursuant to
any exercise of Congressional power, not merely the exercise of
its implementing power under section 5 of the fourteenth amend-
ment.12 Justice O'Connor argued to the contrary, that any def-
erence to Congressional judgment in Fullilove was premised on
section 5's 'specific constitutional mandate to enforce the dictates
of the Fourteenth Amendment' 1 2 9 against the states, and that
section 5 was completely inapposite in assessing the constitution-
ality of the Congressionally approved racial preference at issue
here.130 She also argued that at most, Fullilove applies only to
"congressional measures that seek to remedy identified past dis-
crimination." '131
In my view, in determining the constitutional permissibility of
a Congressionally approved racial preference, the focus should be
on the implementing clauses of the thirteenth, fourteenth and
fifteenth amendments, taken as a whole. These provisions give
Congress broad powers to bring about a condition of racial equality
in this Nation132 and to deal with the consequences of private as
well as governmental discrimination. 33 As Chief Justice Burger
noted in Fullilove, section 5 of the fourteenth amendment "is a
positive grant of legislative power authorizing Congress to exercise
its discretion in determining whether and what legislation is needed
to secure the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment,"' 34 and
that "in no organ of government, state or federal, does there
128. In this connection, it noted that the Burger opinion in Fulliove referred
to Congress' "employ[ing] an amalgam of its specifically delegated powers." Id.
at 3008 n.1l.
129. Id. at 3031 (quoting, Croson, 488 U.S. at 490 (O'Connor, J.)).
130. Id. at 3031.
131. Id.
132. It is my submission that the broad organic purpose of the Reconstruction
Amendments, taken as a whole, was to bring about a condition of black freedom
in the United States. See Consequences, supra note 2, at 731-34.
133. See, e.g., Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968) (Congress,
acting under the implementation clause of the thirteenth amendment, can prohibit
racial discrimination in housing by private persons). In Fulliove, Justice Powell
referred to the thirteenth amendment, observing that, "I believe that the En-
forcement Clauses of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments give Congress
a similar measure of discretion to choose a suitable remedy for the redress of
racial discrimination." 448 U.S. at 508.
134 . 448 U.S. at 476 (quoting Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651
(1966)).
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repose a more comprehensive remedial power than in the Congress,
expressly charged by the Constitution with competence and au-
thority to enforce equal protection guarantees. ' "35 Therefore, he
concluded, when the Court reviews the constitutionality of a pro-
gram of racial preference authorized by Congress, it is "bound to
approach [its] task with appropriate deference to the Congress, a
co-equal branch charged by the Constitution with the power ...
'to enforce, by appropriate legislation,' the equal protection guar-
antees of the Fourteenth Amendment." '" 6
The point to be emphasized is that the specific constitutional
grant of Congressional power to implement racial equality in this
Nation, contained in the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth
amendments, justifies a constitutional proposition that Congress
has greater power than the states to adopt programs of racial
preference. It also justifies a greater degree of judicial deference
to Congress' finding of the necessity for the use of racial preference
to implement particular objectives and its choice of the specific
means of racial preference for implementing those objectives. 137
In addition, whenever Congress chooses to employ racial pref-
erence, its action, in theory, represents a national consensus. There
is no concern, as expressed by O'Connor in Croson, that a black
political majority in a given city or political subdivision will use
its power in a deliberately discriminatory manner. Interestingly
enough, it was Justice Scalia who made this point in Croson. He
pointed out that "[a] sound distinction between federal and state
(or local) action based on race rests not only upon the substance
of the Civil War Amendments, but upon social reality and gov-
135. Id. at 483.
136. Id. at 472. Interestingly enough, in Croson, Justice O'Connor appeared
to take a broader view of Congress' implementing power and the resulting scope
of judicial review than she did in Metro Broadcasting. There she said "that
Congress, unlike any State or political subdivision, has a specific constitutional
mandate to enforce the dictates of the Fourteenth Amendment," which includes
"the power to define the situations which Congress determines threaten principles
of equality and to adopt prophylactic rules to deal with those situations." This
being so said Justice O'Connor, "Congress may identify and redress the effects
of society-wide discrimination." 109 S. Ct. at 719 (emphasis in original). Clearly
Justice O'Connor's view of the Court's role in reviewing the use of race-conscious
criteria by Congress in the exercise of its implementing powers has shifted in the
year between Croson and Metro Broadcasting.
137. However, as indicated by Powell's opinion in Fullilove, this deference
can be accommodated within the framework of an articulated "compelling
governmental interest" standard of review.
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ernmental theory.' 38 He says that "[tihe struggle for racial justice
has historically been a struggle by the national society against
oppression in the individual States,' 139 and that the historical
record shows that "racial discrimination against any group finds
a more ready expression at the state and local rather than at the
federal level.' ' 40 To the extent then that the Court gives some
degree of deference to Congressional judgment when Congress has
adopted or authorized programs of racial preference, its action,
as Justice Scalia said .in Croson, is consistent with "social reality
and governmental theory.' 4' For these reasons, there can be no
principled objection to a constitutional proposition that gives Con-
gress greater power than the states to adopt programs of racial
preference and directs the Court to give some degree of deference
to Congressional judgment in this circumstance.
In Metro Broadcasting, the Court majority readily found that
the "minority enhancement" policy and the "distress sale" policy
were "substantially related" to the achievement of the govern-
ment's "important" interest in "enhancing broadcast diversity."
" T]he interest in enhancing broadcast diversity," said Justice
Brennan, "is, at the very least, an important governmental objec-
tive and is therefore a sufficient basis for the Commission's
minority ownership policies.' ' 42 Brennan drew the analogy to the
"diverse student body" in Bakke contributing to a "robust ex-
change of ideas,' 1 43 and concluded that, "the diversity of views
and information on the airwaves serves important First Amendment
values."144
138. Croson, 109 S. Ct. at 736 (Scalia, J., concurring).
139. Id.
140. Id. at 737.
141. Moreover, Congress institutionally must be responsive to a national
constituency in which whites are in the political majority. In this regard, Dean
Ely's observations as to a reduced level of scrutiny for racial classifications
favoring minorities are pertinent: "[Tihe reasons for being unusually suspicious,
and, consequently, employing a stringent brand of review, are lacking. A White
majority is unlikely to disadvantage itself for reasons of racial prejudice; nor is
it likely to be tempted either to underestimate the needs and deserts of Whites
relative to those of others, or to overestimate the costs of devising an alternative
classification that would extend to certain Whites the advantages generally ex-
tended to Blacks." Ely, The Constitutionality of Reverse Racial Classification,
41 U. Cm. L. Rnv. 723, 735 (1974).
142. 110 S. Ct. at 3010.
143. See supra note 105.
144. 110 S. Ct. at 3010. "The benefits of such diversity are not limited to
the members of the minority groups who gain access to the broadcasting industry
by virtue of the ownership policies; rather, the benefits redound to all members
of the viewing and listening audience." Id. at 3011.
12271990]
THE WAYNE LAW REVIEW
On the matter of "substantially related," Brennan said that
with respect to the "complex empirical question" of the nexus
between minority ownership and programming diversity, the Court
was required to give "great weight to the decisions of Congress
and the experience of the Commission."' 145 He reviewed at length
the empirical basis of the FCC's determination that increased
minority participation in broadcasting promotes programming di-
versity, as reflected in its 1978 Statement of Policy, and Congres-
sional involvement in the matter. He noted that "the judgment
that there is a link between expanded minority ownership and
broadcast diversity does not rest on impermissible stereotyping." 146
"Rather, both Congress and the FCC maintain simply that ex-
panded minority ownership of broadcasting outlets will, in the
aggregate, result in greater broadcast diversity," and "[a] broad-
casting industry with representative minority participation will pro-
duce more variation and diversity than will one whose ownership
is drawn from a single racially and ethnically homogeneous
group."1 47 He also reviewed the history of other FCC efforts to
increase minority ownership and participation in broadcasting and
concluded that "[iln short, the Commission established minority
ownership preferences only after long experience demonstrated that
race-neutral means could not produce adequate broadcasting di-
versity."'4 Finally, he concluded that the burden of the FCC's
policies on non-minority firms was slight, focusing on the fact
that "applicants have no settled expectation that their applications
will be granted without consideration of public interest factors
such as minority ownership." 1 49 He also noted that under the
"minority enhancement" policy: (1) minority ownership does not
guarantee that an applicant will prevail, citing a number of ex-
amples where the license was not given to the minority applicant;
and (2) that the "distress sale" policy affects only a small fraction
of broadcast licenses and then only in very specific circumstances. 0
The Brennan opinion illustrates his application of "strict scru-
tiny" under the "important and substantial relationship" standard.
There was a careful review of the factual determinations by federal
administrative agencies and by the Congress, but at the same time
145. Id.
146. Id. at 3016.
147. Id. at 3016-17.
148. Id. at 3022.
149. Id. at 3026.
150. Id. at 3027.
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there was a deference to their expertise and experience. There was
also a careful consideration of the nature and extent of the burden
that the racial preference imposes on non-minorities, especially in
regard to defeating settled expectations. However, it is clear that
under this application of "strict scrutiny," racial-preference pro-
grams mandated or authorized by Congress are likely to be sus-
tained against constitutional challenge.
The O'Connor dissent, while applying "very strict scrutiny"
to the use of the preferences in issue to advance the objective of
"enhancing broadcast diversity," focused more on the insubstan-
tiality of the asserted interest to justify racial preference. She said
that the only interest that modem equal protection doctrine has
recognized as "compelling" to support the use of racial classifi-
cations is the interest in remedying the effects of identified past
discrimination.'51 The interest in increasing the diversity of broad-
casting viewpoints, stated O'Connor, was clearly not a "compel-
ling" interest. "It is simply too amorphous, too insubstantial, and
too unrelated to any legitimate basis for employing racial classi-
fications."' 52 She also stated that the assertion of this interest
presents an "unsettled First Amendment issue," since the measures
adopted by the FCC are "designed to amplify a distinct set of
views or the views of a particular class of speakers."'5 She
concluded that even if the interest in increasing broadcast diversity
is legitimate in one context, "it does not suddenly become impor-
tant enough to justify distinctions based on race.' 54
Justice O'Connor's application of "strict scrutiny" to the use
of the racial preferences to advance the asserted interests cannot
be separated from her view as to the impermissibility of the asserted
interest in the first place. She insisted that the premise that there
is a nexus between minority ownership of broadcasting facilities,
and targeting programming toward the needs and interests of
minority communities and presenting minority viewpoints rests on
"impermissible racial stereotyping." Instead, the FCC should use
race-neutral means, such as evaluating applicants on their ability
151. She seemingly ignores the holding in Bakke and makes no reference to
her discussion of "diversity" and other possible "compelling" ihterests in Wygant.
She also suggests that "[tlhe FCC or Congress may yet conclude after suitable
examination that narrowly tailored race-conscious measures are required to remedy
discrimination that may be identified in the allocation of broadcasting licenses."
Id. at 3033.
152. Id. at 3034.
153. Id. at 3036.
154. Id.
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and commitment to provide the programming the FCC believes
would address underrepresented viewpoints, and should implement
an effective ascertainment policy to ensure the continued broad-
casting of such programs. 155 She also contended that there has
been an insufficient showing of a nexus between minority owner-
ship and enhancing broadcast diversity: "To the extent that the
FCC cannot show the nexus to be nearly complete, that failure
confirms that the chosen means do not directly advance the asserted
interest, that the policies rest instead upon illegitimate stereotypes,
and that individualized determinations must replace the FCC's use
of race as a proxy for the desired programming."'' 56 Finally, she
found that the programs unduly burdened the interests of non-
minority broadcasting firms. She stated that the "distress sale"
policy operated exactly like an absolute racial quota, and the
"racial enhancement" policy was clearly the dispositive factor in
a substantial percentage of comparative proc-edings. 1'57 Altin ,, ,
O'Connor's application of "very strict scrutiny" occurred in the
context of the use of the particular forms of racial preference to
advance what she considered to be an improper interest, logically
the same kind of application would be required to determine the
permissibility of the use of racial preference to advance the con-
cededly "compelling" interest in overcoming identified past dis-
crimination. As in Croson, O'Connor is saying that "race-neutral"
means must almost always be employed even to overcome the
present consequences of identified past discrimination.
In a brief separate dissent, Justices Kennedy and Scalia launch
a scathing attack on any use of racial preference in governmental
programs and operations, stating that: (1) the Court majority
"exhumes Plessy's5 8 deferential approach to racial classifica-
tions;"15 9 (2) the Constitution does not permit the government to
"discriminate among its citizens on the basis of race in order to
serve interests so trivial as 'broadcast diversity;'. 6 and (3) the
effect of the Court's decision is "that after a century of judicial
opinions we interpret the Constitution to do no more than move
us from 'separate but equal' to 'unequal but benign.""11 6'
155. Id. at 3039-40.
156. Id. at 3041.
157. Id.
158. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
159. 110 S. Ct. at 3044 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
160. Id. at 3045.
161. 110 S. Ct. at 3047.
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Metro Broadcasting makes it clear that the positions on the
Court with respect to the constitutional permissibility of racial
preference in governmental programs and operations have hard-
ened. We will now consider how this hardening of positions may
affect the future direction of the Court in dealing with cases
presenting this fundamental constitutional issue.
Some Concluding Observations
We have suggested earlier that the "unresolvable dilemma"
that confronts American society on the question of racial prefer-
ence has carried over to the Court and that the Court institutionally
has not been able to make the hard and fundamental value
judgment that would enable it to resolve the dilemma. There have
not been five Justices willing to hold that the interest in trying to
overcome the present consequences of the social history of racism
and in bringing about the equal participation of black Americans
in all important aspects of American life is of sufficient importance
and validity to justify a departure from the principle of racial
neutrality and the resulting racial disadvantage to adversely affected
whites. Only three Justices, Brennan, who has now left the Court,
Marshall and Blackmun, have taken this position and have con-
sistently voted to uphold the constitutionality of the particular
racial preference in issue in all of the cases coming before the
Court. Conversely, at the present time it appears that Justices
Rehnquist, Scalia, Kennedy and possibly Justice O'Connor, have
made the value judgment against the constitutional permissibility
of racial preference. They have indicated that they believe that the
use of racial preference is unconstitutional in all or virtually all
circumstances, and that efforts to bring about a condition of racial
equality must be accomplished by "race-neutral" means. 162 The
162. The vehemence of O'Connor's dissent in Metro Broadcasting is at least
some indication that she has made the value judgment against the constitutional
permissibility of racial preference. She has also voted against the constitutionality
of the particular use of racial preference in every case in which she has partici-
pated. While she has repeatedly stated that the government has a "compelling"
interest in overcoming the present consequences of identified past racial discrim-
ination, she has strongly indicated that in most circumstances the government
must advance this interest by "race-neutral" means. Likewise in her Wygant
concurrence, she left open the possibility that she might find a school board's
interest in "faculty diversification" to be "compelling," but I would think this
less likely in light of her rejection of "enhanced broadcast diversity" as a
"compelling" interest in Metro Broadcasting. In any event, it must be assumed
that in a given case Justice O'Connor would be strongly disposed to find
unconstitutional the particular use of racial preference that is in issue.
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fact that these Justices have made the value judgment against the
constitutional permissibility of racial preference clearly does not
demonstrate their hostility to the ideal of racial equality. Quite to
the contrary, they have repeatedly recognized the enormous con-
sequences of the social history of racism that are suffered by black
Americans as a group and have endorsed governmental action
directed toward ending the condition of societal racial inequality.
They insist, however, that as a constitutional matter, this goal
must be accomplished by the use of "race-neutral" means.
The use of "race-neutral" means to achieve racial objectives
may seem .to be a very appealing solution to the societal and
constitutional controversy over racial preference. Such a solution
preserves the ideal of racial neutrality while recognizing the legit-
imate interests of black Americans in achieving a condition of
societal racial equality in this Nation. As Justice O'Connor stated
in Croson: "Business as usual should not mean business pursuant
to the unthinking exclusion of certain members of our society
from its rewards." 16 Scalia makes the point even more strongly
in Croson, when he says that preference for the "disadvantaged"
will disproportionately benefit blacks: "Since blacks have been
disproportionately disadvantaged by racial discrimination, any race-
neutral remedial programs aimed at the disadvantaged as such will
have a disproportionately beneficial impact on blacks." 1" In a
similar vein, when the Bakke case was before the California
Supreme Court, that court took the position that the use of race-
conscious admissions criteria was unconstitutional, because the
university could secure the admission of minority students by giving
preference to "disadvantaged students of all races.' 1 65
This is not the place to discuss the efficacy of "race-neutral"
means to accomplish racial objectives and to bring about a con-
dition of societal racial equality in this Nation.'" If the Consti-
tution were interpreted as prohibiting all or virtually all racial
preference, as a matter of constitutional necessity, "race-neutral"
means would be the only means that could be employed in any
163. 109 S. Ct. at 730.
164. 109 S. Ct. at 739 (emphasis in original).
165. See Sedler, Racial Preference, Reality and the Constitution: Bakke v.
Regents of the University of California, 17 SANTA CInA L. REV. 329, 342-45
(1977).
166. For a discussion as to why a preference for "disadvantaged students
of all races" is problematical as regards the increased admission of black students,
see id. at 343-45.
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effort to benefit blacks, and the ideal of racial neutrality would
be preserved. I doubt, however, that such a constitutional stricture
would cause the societal controversy over racial preference to abate
significantly. The race-based motivation for the "race-neutral"
program would still remain, and if blacks would benefit dispro-
portionately from such "race-neutral" programs, as Scalia main-
tains they could, then whites would still bear disproportionately
the costs of the program. Nonetheless, the constitutional contro-
versy over racial preference would come to an end. 167
With the departure of Justice Brennan from the Court, and
with his replacement, it is quite possible that the Court could end
up making the fundamental value judgment against the constitu-
tional impermissibility of racial preference. However, the Court
institutionally has to deal with the stare decisis effect of its
previously decided cases and the doctrine the Court has promul-
gated in those cases. Any prediction as to what the Court will do
in the future in this highly controversial area is sheer speculation.
167. As I have discussed elsewhere, the Court's constitutional doctrine in
the area of racial equality has developed with reference to the concept of invidious
racial discrimination. See Racial Preference, supra note 10, at 1228-30. The Court
could have held in Korematsu, for example, that the Constitution prohibits all
racial discrimination. If it had done so, the racial exclusion order in Korematsu
would have been held unconstitutional without further inquiry. Korematsu v.
United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). If this had been the constitutional doctrine,
as some commentators contend it should be, there probably never would have
been an issue as to the constitutionality of "benign" racial discrimination. See
supra note 13. Governmental bodies would have known that they could not
employ race-conscious criteria favoring blacks, and, instead, would have had to
resort to "race-neutral" methods of advancing racial objectives. If a law school
or medical school, for example, wanted to increase the number of minority
students, it would know that it could do so only by the use of "race-neutral"
means, such as a preference for "disadvantaged" students.
Instead, the Court has interpreted the Constitution as prohibiting only
invidious racial discrimination, the use of race-conscious criteria that is not
"necessary to the accomplishment of some permissible state objective, independent
of the racial discrimination which it was the object of the Fourteenth Amendment
to eliminate." Loving v. Virginia,-388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967). Thus, under the Court's
current constitutional doctrine, the use of racial preference benefiting racial
minorities must be analyzed with reference to the concept of invidious racial
discrimination. When such use satisfies the "strict scrutiny" of the "compelling
governmental interest" standard or "important and substantial relationship"
standard when mandated or authorized by Congress, it does not amount to
invidious racial discrimination, and is not unconstitutional. An absolute prohi-
bition against the use of "benign" racial preference, therefore, would properly
require the Court to undertake a complete reconsideration of the invidious racial
discrimination concept.
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Therefore, I will conclude by doing no more than reviewing the
precedents and doctrine and suggesting some possibilities for the
future direction of the Court.
Based on Metro Broadcasting and Fuilove, the Court has held
that Congress has greater power than the states to adopt racial
preference programs and that Congressionally approved racial pref-
erence programs are to be tested under the "important and sub-
stantial relationship" standard of review rather than the purportedly
more strict "compelling governmental interest." It is possible that
a newly constituted Court would revisit Metro Broadcasting, and
as O'Connor argued in her dissent, would limit Congressional
power to reaching past discriminatory state action under section 5
of the fourteenth amendment, and would hold that the "compelling
governmental interest" standard applies to Congressionally ap-
proved racial preference programs. On the other hand, it is possible
that the Court will accept the holding and doctrine of these cases,
and to this extent, will be more disposed to uphold Congressionally
approved racial preference programs.
In Bakke, the Court upheld as constitutional the use of race-
conscious admissions programs to achieve racial diversity in a
university student body. If the question squarely arose again, it is
possible that O'Connor and one or more of the other Justices
would accept as constitutional the use of race-conscious admissions
criteria for this purpose. More significantly, I do not think that
the Court institutionally is prepared to reconsider Bakke, and so
it is not likely to grant certiorari to any case to review the
constitutionality of a university's race-conscious admissions pro-
gram. I also think it is possible that if squarely presented with the
question, a Court majority might uphold the use of a "racial
enhancement" factor, again as per Bakke, in faculty hiring deci-
sions by a school board or university in order to achieve "faculty
diversification."
Coming now to the use of racial preference to overcome the
present consequences of identified past discrimination for which
the government is responsible, it is true, as Justice O'Connor has
stated, that "[t]he Court is in agreement that ... remedying past
or present racial discrimination ... is a sufficiently weighty state
interest to warrant the remedial use of a carefully constructed
affirmative action program. ' 16 However, the likelihood of the
Court upholding a particular racial preference program, adopted
168. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 286. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
1234 [Vol. 36:1187
METRO BROADCASTING
by state or local governments to advance this objective, at the
present time is at best problematical. Croson makes clear that the
governmental body must have a "substantial basis in evidence"
for finding the existence of past discrimination, and that its
findings in this regard will be subject to very careful judicial
scrutiny. Most of the "identified past discrimination" cases where
lower federal courts have upheld racially preferential hiring and
promotion programs have involved discrimination in the police
force and other components of the civil service of state and local
governments. This discrimination has been notorious and wide-
spread in times past, and usually there would be no problem in
showing that there is a "substantial basis in evidence" for finding
the existence of identified past discrimination. 169 Racially prefer-
ential hiring and promotion programs directed toward overcoming
the present consequences of this "easily identified" past discrimi-
nation have long been in place in many cities and states, and cases
involving such programs are not now likely to come before the
Court.
If the Court does grant review in another case where a state
or local governmental body asserts the "identified past discrimi-
nation" justification, it is likely that this will be a minority business
enterprise set-aside case or another case where it may be difficult
to satisfy the "substantial basis in evidence" test. There is also
the possibility that a Court majority will find that the particular
form of racial preference was not "precisely tailored" to advance
the remedial objective, because there was no showing that a "race-
neutral" method would not be effective for this purpose. Thus,
constitutional doctrine is that, "remedying past or present racial
discrimination by a state actor is a sufficiently weighty state interest
to warrant the remedial use of a carefully constructed affirmative
action program,1 170 however, as a practical matter, it may be
difficult to sustain a particular use of racial preference on this
basis. Again, as regards efforts to increase the participation of
minority firms in governmental contracting, a governmental body
would be better advised to adopt a racially neutral "locally owned
small business" preference.
In summary, to the extent that the Court will be willing to
uphold the constitutionality of racial preference, it is more likely
to be programs authorized by Congress or other governmental
169. See, e.g., Detroit Police Officers Ass'n v. Young, 608 F.2d 671 (6th
Cir. 1979).
170. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 286.
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programs involving a limited racial preference, such as a "racial
enhancement" factor, to achieve a racially diverse student body,
or to create "faculty diversification" in the public schools or
universities. It will uphold racial preference designed to overcome
the present consequences of identified past discrimination for which
the government is responsible only if the governmental body sat-
isfies the exacting "substantial basis in evidence" test and possibly
even then, only if race-neutral means would not be effective to
advance the remedial objective. This is not very likely to happen
in practice.
While the Court has not yet resolved its institutional ambiva-
lence as to the constitutional permissibility of racial preference,
the positions on the Court have now hardened, and the views of
eight Justices can readily be ascertained. It is possible that the
addition of two new Justices will see the Court make the institu-
tional value judgment against the constitutional permissibility of
racial preferences, but this is by no means certain. At least for
now, the end result of the Court's institutional ambivalence has
been a constitutional compromise over a fundamental issue that
eludes both constitutional and societal consensus in this Nation.
It may be that this constitutional compromise will continue to be
the "better part of constitutional wisdom."
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